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2Chapter 1
Introduction and Background
Over the past five years, the Russian Federation has emerged from a deep financial crisis
to a promising— yet so far brief— period of economic stability, declining inflation, and
solid growth.  And, in the past dozen years, privatization of economic activity, productive
assets, and real property has progressed remarkably, if unevenly, across the country.
As in most countries, housing in the Russian Federation is critically important, not only
as a basic need for all people, but as a measure of one’s comfort and well-being and an
object of one’s aspirations.  For the government of the Russian Federation, housing
presents both a challenge and an opportunity.  The core housing problems in Russia— a
physical shortage of housing stock, large numbers of deteriorated dwellings, and high
housing costs that are unaffordable for most families— are problems shared by many
countries.
The Federal Government of the Russian Federation has recently assigned housing— and
housing finance in particular— a top priority on its short list of economic goals.  As the
national economy stabilizes, home mortgage finance has just begun to demonstrate in
Russia how it can make housing affordable for those who were unable to buy their own
flat.
Among Russia’s macroeconomic statistics, home mortgage lending in Russia today
barely registers.  The entire home mortgage market at present is estimated to be only
about 30 to 50 billion RUR (USD$1 to $1.7 billion, or a mere 0.1 to 0.2 percent of
national GDP.  The mortgage market’s high annual growth rate of 50 to 100 percent is
understandable, given Russia’s size and the present low levels of mortgage lending.
The longer term potential, moreover, is huge.  Growing rapidly as well is the expressed
interest in how to make housing finance in Russia work more effectively to meet this
great potential.
A number of recent studies on housing finance in the Russian Federation describe current
programs and practices, identify many problems and impediments, and suggest possible
remedial actions.  Partly as an outgrowth of this work, the Institute for Urban Economics
commissioned this Report to focus specifically on mortgage default insurance and its
possible role in helping to advance home mortgage lending in Russia.
Mortgage default insurance: definition and purpose
Mortgage default insurance (MI) is a specialized form of credit insurance.  MI protects
mortgage lenders against loss by reason of borrower default when the collateral property
value is insufficient to pay off the outstanding debt.  Mortgage default insurance covers a
unique type of insurance hazard, with an unusually long exposure period.  Besides
covering “normal” borrower defaults, MI serves as an economic “shock absorber” which
3requires the financial capacity to withstand losses from a severe recession or even an
economic catastrophe.  More than other lines of insurance, MI’s claims and losses can be
highly influenced by government actions, whether these are national economic policies or
the actions of regional or even municipal governments.
By reducing a lender’s credit risk, mortgage default insurance encourages lenders to
qualify more prospective borrowers for a mortgage loan.  Most commonly, availability of
MI can expand lending for a home purchase by reducing the amount of cash that a first
time buyer is required to accumulate for the down payment.  By serving as an “equity
substitute”, MI can permit more families to own their own home sooner.
Another potential use of MI— again by reducing mortgage credit risk— is  to induce
institutional investors (the “secondary market”) to purchase mortgage-backed
investments, thereby increasing the flow of capital into home mortgage lending.
Preparation of this Report
In preparing this Report, the authors held nearly twenty face-to-face interviews in
Moscow during November, 2003.  These visits included dialogue with about three dozen
individuals who have specialized knowledge and experience in the Russian housing
finance market, particularly Moscow.
The purpose of these interviews was to gain an understanding of the current status and
unique workings of Russia’s emerging private sector housing and mortgage market; to
hear first hand the perspectives of government and private sector participants and housing
market experts regarding the problems presented by current practices and the existing
conditions; finally, to solicit ideas on where housing finance in Russia may be headed,
and how— or whether— some form of mortgage default insurance could assist in
advancing mortgage lending and home ownership in Russia.
Prior to conducting these interviews, the authors reviewed a number of recent and
informative reports on the state of housing and mortgage finance in the Russian
Federation, as well as a number of other published source materials.  A complete listing
of individual interviewees and written sources materials appears as Appendix A of this
Report.
The balance of this Report is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 provides highlights of mortgage default insurance programs, both government
and privately sponsored, in ten diverse national markets, including the soon-to-be-
launched MI program in neighboring Kazakhstan.  This international discussion
concludes with some lessons learned elsewhere as a result of severe crises or outright
failure.  Chapter 2 provides a more detailed version of the authors’ presentation on
international MI given at a group forum held at IUE in Moscow on November 19, 2003.
4Chapter 3 offers a “MI readiness scorecard” for the Russian Federation, in which we
profile many of the individual attributes and prerequisites of a successful mortgage
insurance program as they relate to the current mortgage finance environment in Russia.
Each area is identified as a relatively supportive or non-supportive element, under today’s
conditions, with respect to the near term prospects for a successful introduction of MI
into Russia.
Chapter 4 explains mortgage insurance pricing.  The discussion begins by placing the
pricing function in the broader context of classifying and assessing risk, for underwriting
as well as for pricing; then addresses the various individual components (variables) of a
MI pricing model; finally, describes briefly how the key variables are defined for input
into a working model.
Chapter 5 offers first a series of findings, then followed by recommendations regarding
the establishment of MI in Russia.  The recommendations cover issues ranging from
prerequisite actions needed, to relevant legislative agenda items, potential program
sponsorship, broad policy and program design features, and essential elements of an
action plan to prepare for mortgage default insurance.
Appendixes B, C, D, and E  to this Report summarize the MI readiness scorecard; provide
further detail regarding the MI pricing model; and offer a detailed loan level data set that
the authors have prepared for consideration by the Central Bank of Russia as a uniform
standard for data collection by regulated banks.  This uniform data set would provide an
empirical foundation for setting proper MI tariff rates, while helping to strengthen bank
regulation.
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Mortgage Default Insurance – International Highlights
Introduction
Mortgage default insurance (MI) programs and experience in a number of other
countries, both developing and developed, may offer useful insight to policymakers in the
Russian Federation as they contemplate how and whether such a program might advance
their own goals for housing the Russian people.  In addition to presenting country-by-
country program highlights, we shall discuss such issues as sponsorship, capital
treatment, regulation, social orientation, and “best and worst practices”.
In this chapter, we shall look at a variety of international MI programs, as shown in
Exhibit 2-1 below.
Exhibit 2-1
Country Inception Year Sponsorship
United States 1934 and 1956 Government and Private
Canada 1954 and 1963 Government and Private
Australia & New Zealand 1965 Private (formerly gov’t)
United Kingdom Pre-1970 Private
South Africa 1989 NGO/Private Reinsurance
Israel 1998 Private
Hong Kong 1999 GSE/Private Reinsurance
The Philippines 1950 Government
Lithuania 1999 Government
Kazakhstan 2004 projected Government
India, Mexico, Taiwan Under development Government & Private
These programs range from those with over half a century of experience (U.S., The
Philippines) to those only recently begun (Lithuania, Hong Kong, Israel) and one in
neighboring Kazakhstan that is not yet writing coverage, but which appears to be nearing
a launch date.  These MI programs include notably different types of sponsorship,
including direct government, GSE/government-sponsored enterprise, NGO/nonprofit, and
private sector sponsor/owner.  It is to soon to tell how effectively reinsurance will serve
the different types of sponsors through risk sharing.
6Country overview
Exhibit 2-2 summarizes for each country’s MI programs key highlights including number
of companies/providers, total capital, insurance written, number of lenders served, and
share of total origination market.  This information has been gathered from a combination
of published sources and direct inquiries of MI providers.
Exhibit 2-2
Country No. of
Providers
Total
Capital
Insurance
Written
No. lenders
Served
Ins. Share of
Orig. Mkt
U.S. – private MI 7 $16 bb $337 bb thousands 13.4%
U.S. – gov’t MI 2 $23 bb $187 bb thousands 7.5%  (FHA)
Canada 2 $1.4 bb $42 bb 140 50% approx.
Australia/NZ 2 $367 mm $60 bb 200 40% approx.
United Kingdom n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
S. Africa 1 $25 mm $205 mm n.a. n.a.
Israel 1 $11 mm $450 mm 8 11%
Hong Kong 5 n.a. $15 bb 40+ 15% approx.
Philippines 1 $109 mm $280 mm n.a. n.a.
Lithuania 1 $4.25 mm $30 mm 8 33% approx.
Kazakhstan 1 $3.3 mm n.a. 8 to 12 est. n.a.
Notes to Exhibit 2-2:
--All dollar amounts shown are U.S.
--U.S. government-sponsored program data is FHA only.  Other national MI program is
   VA (military veterans).  Six individual states also sponsor small MI programs.
--Data shown is most recent available, typically 2002.
--Canada: Data for government program only.  No information provided on private
   program.
Among the countries surveyed, both government and privately sponsored MI programs in
the United States show the longest history, highest volume and greatest number of
competitive providers.  However, as the remainder of this chapter will show, each of
these countries programs and experience offers potentially useful guidance for the
Russian Federation as it contemplates the introduction of an MI program.
Program highlights
Exhibit 2-3 summarizes key MI program features for each of the countries surveyed.
These features reflect a combination of public and private decisions relating to indicated
risks, market preferences and requirements, and general policy objectives.  What is
shown are features currently offered, although the sequence of steps taken to arrive at
current program offerings may also be noteworthy.
7This observation is especially germane regarding maximum insurable loan-to-value ratio.
Many, if not most, countries with successfully seasoned MI programs, arrived at their
current LTV ratio limits over a period of time, typically following the development of
some underwriting comfort and risk experience at lower LTV limits.
Examples abound.  In the U.S. the main government sponsored program, the Federal
Housing Administration’s (FHA’s) Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund began during the
Great Depression of the 1930’s with an 80 percent LTV limit— this at a time when the
“benchmark” LTV in the private market was a conservative 66 2/3 percent.  Over the
ensuing years, FHA’s maximum LTV was lifted from 80 to 90, 90 to 95 and 95 to 97
percent, and recently to as high as 100 percent.
Exhibit 2-3
  Country Maximum
Loan-to-
Value Ratio
Typical
Coverage
Percentage
Maximum
Loan
Term
Premium
Payment
Options
Typical
Premium
Rates
U.S. – Gov’t-
sponsored MI
97 – 100% 100%  FHA
25-50% VA
30 years Annual 1.5% initial
0.5% annual
renewal
U.S – Privately
sponsored MI
97 – 100%+ 17 to 25% 30 years Monthly,
Annual,
Prepaid
0.3% to
1.0% per
year
Canada – Gov’t 95% 100% 30 years Prepaid 1% to 3.75%
Australia & NZ 95% 100% Austr.
20 to 30% NZ
30 years Annual or
Prepaid
$USD140 to
3.2% prepaid
United Kingdom 100%+ Negotiable 30 years Prepaid,
added to
interest rate
Negotiable
South Africa No limit
published
20% 5 years Prepaid 2.0%
Israel 90% 20 to 30% 20-25 years Prepaid 3 to 4%
Hong Kong 90% 10 to 25% 25 years Prepaid 1.4 to 3.35%
The Philippines 70 to 100% 85 to 100% 30 years Annual 2 to 2.75%
Lithuania 95% 25%+int/costs 25 years Prepaid 2.8 to 4.3%
Kazakhstan 85% 50% 15 years Prepaid 2.4%
Likewise, the private MI industry in the U.S. began in the 1950’s with a maximum
insurable limit of 90 percent at a time when the uninsured LTV benchmark was 75-80%.
Only after 15 years’ experience was the privately insurable limit raised to 95 percent;
another 25 years elapsed before the 95 percent LTV limit was further relaxed to 97
percent, and more recently to as high as 100 percent.  Canada and Australia/New Zealand
experienced a similar history.
8In looking at some more recently launched programs, we see a similar pattern.  The
Israeli program entered a market where the uninsured benchmark LTV was 60 percent
with an initial offering up to 80 percent LTV.  After several years underwriting (though
not claims) experience, that program’s LTV limit recently was raised to 90 percent.
Likewise in Hong Kong, for the first few years following its 1999 launch, the highest
LTV insurance loan was 85 percent.  That limit, too, has recently been raised to 90
percent.
Initial loan-to-value ratio (typically a direct indicator of the borrower’s equity
investment) has proven to be a predominant indicator of subsequent default probability.
Accordingly, (with one exception noted below), the setting of premium rates based upon
LTV ratio makes compelling sense.  Also advisable is exercising patience in allowing a
new MI program to develop and season.  It is preferable initially to set the maximum
insurable LTV ratio above the existing uninsured national benchmark, yet not to be
overly aggressive in this regard, even if the market seems to be demanding more.
Another significant decision regarding program design that must be made at the outset is
the percent of total loan amount to insure against loss.  While at first it may seem natural
and desirable to provide a 100 percent cover (and surely most lenders and investors
would welcome full coverage), there are compelling reasons to adopt a MI program
having less— considerably less— than 100 percent coverage.  The central reason for
offering less than 100 percent risk protection is the need for the originating lender to
share directly in the credit risk exposure.  For it is the originating lender that has the
greatest control over the risk being created, both in terms of its initial underwriting and its
subsequent servicing and collections for that insured loan.  Exhibit 2-3 above shows that
most, though not all MI sponsors in various countries— both government and private—
have chosen to offer less than a 100 percent MI cover.  Of special note is the Lithuanian
MI program, launched in 1999 with 100 percent coverage and revised in 2002 with
coverage reduced to 25 percent, plus four months’ interest and certain allowable costs.
A third program design consideration that is highlighted in Exhibit 2-3 concerns the
method of MI insurance premium (tariff) payment.  What particular MI premium
payment mechanism, or what choice of mechanisms best suits a particular national
mortgage market such as that of the Russian Federation?  While it’s generally preferable
to allow the market to adapt to buyer and seller preferences over time, some decision
must be made at the outset on how MI premiums are to be paid— in addition, of course,
to what the appropriate premium rate will be.
Exhibit 2-3 reveals a mix of prepaid (lump sum), annual, and monthly payment schemes
(with the monthly option— a rather recent development— prevalent only in the U.S.).  For
reasons of administrative simplicity, likely affordability and consumer acceptance, and
optimal insurance fund management, a prepaid premium scheme generally appears most
attractive.  This option becomes even more attractive when the entire premium payment
can be ‘financed’ by incorporating it into the initial loan balance, thereby enabling the
9borrower to absorb the cost of the insurance over the loan term, while at the same time
strengthening the new insurance fund with an early revenue infusion.
Annual MI premium payments, whether paid separately or incorporated into the
mortgage interest rate, also are widespread and quite feasible.  In the Russian Federation,
there are several legal issues that may bear upon the question of what premium payment
scheme would work best subject to changes in the current law on mortgage lending.
MI premium rates typically are calculated against the total loan amount, irrespective of
the percent of the loan actually covered.  Premium rates vary widely, both within and
among the countries shown in Exhibit 2-3.  Reasons for these variations are discussed
further in Chapter 4 (Pricing).
Orientation toward ‘social’ housing varies among countries with regard to their MI
programs.  Privately sponsored MI companies generally do not restrict or skew their
programs or tariffs to favor lower income, or other special needs of borrowers.
Government sponsored MI programs vary in this regard.  In the U.S., the predominant
FHA program is, by law, unsubsidized.  But this program does have insurable loan limits
that effectively favor middle-class, rather than luxury housing.  Historically, though not
at present, a uniform premium rate was applied to all FHA insured loans, regardless of
LTV ratio or other documented risk factors.  This feature created a cross-subsidy,
whereby excess premium income from lower-risk, middle-income borrowers served to
subsidize the cost of insuring higher-risk lower income borrowers.
Some smaller, separate “special risk” FHA programs have been targeted toward lower
income, subsidized housing.  Actuarially sound premiums have not been required under
these more socially oriented programs.  Their history, however, has included adverse
claims experience and calls upon the U.S. Treasury for additional capital.
Government-sponsored MI programs in other countries have been more directly targeted
toward social housing.  The Philippines’ MI program, for example, charges lower
premium rates for its “socialized” and “low cost” housing loans and higher premiums for
its “medium cost” and full market rate housing.  In addition, more generous guaranty
terms and higher LTV’s are insurable for social and low-cost housing, than for mid-to-
higher- priced housing.  Finally, a larger fixed percentage of total capital (guaranty
writing capacity) is allocated to insuring social and low-cost housing.
South Africa’s MI program also places a high priority on social goals.  Eligible borrowers
must fall within rather modest income limits.  The program’s premium rates are set at
levels below what is needed to cover all operating expenses in addition to claims.
A third type of social orientation is found in Lithuania.  Here, the government-sponsored
MI program serves a wide range of borrowers, and established premium rates appear to
be high enough to be self-sustaining.  However, about half of all borrowers under this
program are classified as having special needs (e.g., currently living in inadequate or
overcrowded housing) and, as a result, their MI premiums are substantially subsidized.
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Regulatory highlights
Several aspects of MI regulation cut across international lines and help to highlight key
differences between mortgages default insurance from other more widely understood
lines of insurance.  We shall look briefly at the following topics associated either with the
direct regulation of mortgage default insurance, or regulation relating to users of
mortgage default insurance:
?  Monoline insurance
?  Risk-based capital
?  Contingency reserves
?  Conflict of interest
?  Government-mandated use of MI
?  Bank risk-based capital credit for use of MI
?  Secondary market mandate for use of MI
?  Investment grade rating standards applied to MI
Monoline insurance refers to an insurance charter or franchise that limits a company or
program to the writing of a single line of insurance (as opposed to “multiline” carriers
that are authorized to write many lines of coverage under a single charter).  Critical to a
monoline insurance program is the segregation of capital and loss reserves to cover only
those risks arising from a single designated line of insurance.
Exhibit 2-4 below shows which of the countries surveyed apply a monoline restriction to
their government and private MI programs.
Exhibit 2-4
Country Monoline MI?
United States – Government MI Yes
United States – Private MI Yes
Canada Yes
Australia/New Zealand Yes
United Kingdom No
South Africa No
Israel Yes
Hong Kong Yes
The Philippines Yes
Lithuania Unknown
Kazakhstan Yes
For a mortgage default insurance fund, be it government or privately capitalized, a
monoline restriction is highly desirable.  The essential nature of the risk insured is that of
an economic catastrophe.  Pricing, reserving, underwriting, and analytical methods
applicable to mortgage default insurance are quite distinct from those, which apply to
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other lines of insurance.  So, too, is the overall skill set required of MI program
management.
A segregated (monoline) reserve fund for MI also enables outside regulators and rating
agencies to properly evaluate— and model, as applicable— the long-term adequacy of
capital reserves in the event of severe economic depression.
Conversely, insurance regulators need to be vigilant regarding the long-term solvency of
non-mortgage insurance carriers under their jurisdiction.  This responsibility is more
reliably fulfilled if other multi-line carriers (e.g., property & casualty) maintain reserve
funds that are insulated from the type of massive claims that a mortgage default insurer
would face in the event of economic depression.  This consideration is aptly illustrated in
the U.S. where state-sponsored “guaranty funds, which pay claims to policyholders of
insolvent carriers, exclude mortgage default insurers from participation in these backup
funds.  The risks of MI are simply too great and too different for them to be included.
Risk-based capital is a type of regulatory rule especially applicable (though not unique)
to mortgage default insurance.  Under such a rule, the total aggregate amount of
insurance risk outstanding (i.e., the total amount of claims liability if all policies in force
went to claim) cannot exceed a certain ratio, or multiple; relative to the programs total
capital reserves.  This is quite a different type of minimum capital rule than applies to
most property & casualty and life insurance carriers and, in practice, one which imposes a
far higher burden of required capital relative to insurance written than is typically found
under a country’s general (nonlife) insurance regulations.
Exhibit 2-5 below shows which of the countries surveyed apply a risk-based capital rule
to their government and private MI programs.
Exhibit 2-5
Country Risk-based capital
required for MI?
United States – Government MI Yes
United States – Private MI Yes
Canada Yes
Australia/New Zealand Yes
United Kingdom No
South Africa No
Israel Yes
Hong Kong No
The Philippines Yes
Lithuania Unknown
Kazakhstan Decision pending
A risk-based capital rule allows for a higher monoline capital requirement to be applied,
one which will be maintained in proportion to the catastrophic risk exposure inherent to
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MI.  Monoline risk-based capital also rationalizes the task of gauging the claims-paying
capacity of the MI fund under simulated conditions of severe economic distress.
Contingency reserve is a special regulatory concept that historically has been applied to
privately capitalized mortgage default insurance in a number of developed economies, as
shown in Exhibit 2-6 below.  Most insurers (including regulated mortgage default
insurers) are required to maintain loss reserves against policies where the insurer is on
notice that an ‘event of loss’ has occurred where a claim is likely to follow within a
foreseeable period of time.  These ‘case basis’ loss reserves, or loss provisioning, cover
normal losses that occur over the life of any portfolio or ‘book of business’.  Mortgage
default insurance experiences such ‘normal’ claims arising from unemployment, divorce,
or other destabilizing events that impact borrower households.
Exhibit 2-6
Country Contingency reserve
required for MI?
United States – Government MI n.a.
United States – Private MI Yes
Canada Yes
Australia/New Zealand Yes
United Kingdom No
South Africa No
Israel Yes
Hong Kong Yes
The Philippines n.a
Lithuania n.a
Kazakhstan Yes, in modified form
A Contingency Reserve, by contrast, is defined as a requirement that the MI carrier
allocate a specified percentage of all premium earnings to a special segregated reserve
account, where it must remain for an extended number of years, during which time it can
be used only to pay claims that are attributable to economic recession or depression.
Payments from the Contingency Reserve can be made only when normal claim payments
exceed some pre-designated percentage of premiums earned in any given year.  Special
tax provisions may also apply.
In today’s insurance and financial markets, a contingency reserve, while helpful in
assuring the long-term financial strength and solvency of a MI program, is no longer as
important as it once was.  Today, economic and financial modeling, including so-called
‘economic stress-testing’ of MI portfolios, has become quite sophisticated, especially
when applied by the major investment rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s,
Moody’s and FitchIBCA.  These stress models— including detailed analyses of risk
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classification, concentration and pricing, and accompanied by financial, operating, and
management reviews— have reduced the importance of requiring a contingency reserve.
For a startup MI program, in an undeveloped market, some level of increased capital or
reserve allocation that can provide additional claims-paying capability under a
catastrophic economic scenario may be advisable.  And, as noted, for a government-
sponsored program, where a government guaranty is provided, a contingency reserve is
not as relevant.
Special conflict of interest regulations apply to private MI firms operating in several
developed markets, including the U.S., Canada and Australia.  These include— unusual
for the insurance business— prohibitions against the paying of commissions for the
placement of business by the insured (lender) or its agent with a particular insurance firm.
Restrictions apply to the payment of any kind of financial incentives, rebates, kickbacks,
etc., all of which are viewed as antithetical to the interests of the borrower-homebuyer
who, while not the beneficiary of the insurance policy, ultimately pays the cost of MI.
Likewise, most notably in the U.S., private MI firms are not permitted to be owned or
controlled by lenders who use their services. This restriction is needed to help assure both
underwriting and financial independence between lender and insurer, and also to protect
the consumer— the mortgage borrower who is not a direct party to the insurance contract
— from being required to pay for MI coverage when it may not be needed, or from being
charged more than is needed.
As discussed later in this Report, the Russian Federation may need to modify some of its
laws that currently restrict how insurance may be written and who pays, when third
parties are involved, as is the case with MI and several other lines commonly associated
with home mortgage financing.  To the extent these laws were designed to protect the
consumer, any reforms that may be needed to make MI work well may need to be
accompanied by specific new conflict of interest laws to assure that MI helps homebuyers
without adding needlessly to their costs.
Regulatory capital incentives or a direct mandate to use MI on high LTV loans is
quite common, as shown in Exhibit 2-7.  There are several good reasons for such
regulatory incentives or a mandate to be established by a country’s bank regulator for
lenders that make and/or invest in high LTV ratio home loans, including:
?  To protect against “adverse selection of risk” by lenders against insurers, whereby
the lender selects, loan by loan, to place only the inferior risks with the insurer, a
practice that can threaten the viability of any MI program;
?  To assure that the highest risk segment of home loans, when made in great
volume, does not imperil regulated banks’ solvency during periods of economic
adversity; and
?  To tap an independent source of capital and underwriting expertise (insurance
sector) for systemic risk management purposes.
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Exhibit 2-7
While most countries that use one of these bank regulatory tools today lean toward the
risk-based capital incentive option, Canada is a notable exception in its longstanding—
and apparently successful— mandate that all regulated banks purchase either government
or qualified private mortgage default insurance on all loans made that exceed a
benchmark 75 percent LTV ratio.
The risk-based capital incentive, by all accounts effective, rests upon the broad risk-based
capital guidelines for banks established under the international Basle Accords, which
guidelines may be modified by a nation’s central bank to fit its own particular needs and
circumstances.  In many countries, the residential mortgage is considered to be a
relatively high quality, low risk bank asset that warrants favorable risk-based capital
treatment, i.e., a lower-than-100-percent risk weighting that is applied to most
commercial and construction loans, including mortgage loans on income-producing real
estate.  Most often, the assigned risk weight for home mortgages has been reduced by one
half, from 100 to 50 percent for loans held in portfolio.
Home loans carrying a full government guaranty in developed markets, such as that
provided by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in the U.S. or the Canada
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC) generally receive 100 percent risk-based
capital relief.  Of particular interest in Canada in this regard is that a risk-based capital
reduction of 95 percent is given to lenders that use that country’s only private MI firm.
This attractive financial incentive reflects the fact that the Canadian government provides
the private MI carrier a catastrophic reinsurance backup in the event that it were to
become insolvent in the face of economic catastrophe.
Risk experience with home mortgage loans across a number of countries and over many
decades’ reveals that, as loan-to-value ratio increases and borrower equity decreases, the
risk of default and loss rises dramatically.  Even in markets where the generic residential
loan is demonstrably low-risk, high LTV loans are not considered to be low risk and,
Country Risk-based capital
incentive to use MI?
Regulatory
mandate to use MI?
United States – Government MI n.a. n.a.
United States – Private MI Yes No
Canada Yes Yes
Australia/New Zealand Yes-Australia No
United Kingdom No No
South Africa No No
Israel Yes No
Hong Kong Yes No
The Philippines n.a No
Lithuania No No
Kazakhstan Decision pending No
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therefore, may not warrant the same favorable risk-based capital treatment.  Bank
regulators can align lender risk exposure on high LTV loans with those that are below a
country’s accepted LTV benchmark by granting capital relief on high LTV loans— up to
some high-end limit— conditional upon their being covered by qualified mortgage default
insurance.  Currently the laws relative to mortgage lending in Russia create a condition
whereby all mortgage loans are considered high risk without regard to their LTV ratio.
A secondary market mandate to use MI, while differing from a regulatory mandate,
can have a comparable beneficial effect.  MI requirements relating to secondary market/
MBS investments may also be linked, when the MI is privately capitalized, to a minimum
investment grade rating assigned to the claims-paying capacity of the qualified mortgage
insurer.  In the U.S. and Hong Kong, the use of qualified MI is mandated by government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs), i.e., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Hong Kong
Mortgage Corporation.  Exhibit 2-8 shows how countries surveyed have positioned their
MI programs in this regard.
Exhibit 2-8
Failures and other crises experienced by MI providers in other countries can offer
valuable guidance for those in the Russian Federation who certainly will want to avoid
suffering similar crises.  A number of such experiences are recounted briefly below.
?  In the United States in the early 1930’s, eighteen previously thriving mortgage
default insurance firms went bankrupt and failed to pay their claim obligations at
the onset of the Great Depression.  Major causes of this disaster included: (1)
incompetent and inadequate regulation; (2) conflicts of interest with insured
lenders, including interlocking ownership and control; (3) grossly inadequate
reserves; (4) insurance of real estate other than homes, including vacant land and
uncompleted construction; (5) unsupported property valuations.  The outcome:
Much hardship suffered by individual investors in ‘mortgage participation
Country Secondary market/GSE
mandate to use MI?
Standard investment
grade rating for MI
United States – Government MI Yes n.a.
United States – Private MI Yes AA
Canada No n.a.
Australia/New Zealand No AA
United Kingdom No No
South Africa No AA+
Israel No AAA
Hong Kong Yes A - AA
The Philippines n.a n.a.
Lithuania n.a n.a.
Kazakhstan Yes No
16
certificates, and the creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA)
Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund in 1934.
?  In the United States in the 1980’s a dozen private mortgage insurance firms
suffered massive losses, including over USD$1 billion in a single year, resulting
from a combination of regional recession and plummeting energy prices;
overzealous lending and weak insurers underwriting; introduction of new and
volatile mortgage instruments; under-pricing of MI, insuring of loans on non-
owner-occupied (investor-owned) properties; and widespread fraud.  One leading
MI firm, previously rated ‘AA’ by national rating agencies, became insolvent and
had to be liquidated.  The resolution: Much tighter underwriting; curtailment of
the highest risk programs; substantial premium rate increases; consolidation of the
weaker companies; and fresh capital infusions by some parent companies.
?  In the United States in the late 1980’s, the FHA’s flagship mortgage insurance
program, successful for over 50 years, became technically insolvent for much the
same set of reasons enumerated just above.  The resolution: Federal legislation
mandating major reforms, including minimum risk-based capital; a substantial
premium rate increase; a statutory requirement for an annual actuarial audit and
report by a private outside accounting firm.
?  In Canada, following the 1980’s energy crisis and massive regional foreclosures
and claims, Canada’s only remaining private MI firm was financially weakened to
the point where it ceased writing new business.  A costly and unworkable
foreclosure law in the depressed energy-producing province (subject state)
contributed to this firm’s demise.
?  In the United Kingdom, economic weakness and the bursting of a home price
‘bubble’ in the London area and several other markets caused MI carriers to face
massive claims and losses, resulting in the failure of one leading insurer and
nonpayment of many claims by others.  Poorly written insurance contracts
resulted in widespread misunderstandings and disputes between insurers and
lenders.  The outcome: Program reforms, including reduced coverages, greater
risk sharing and higher prices, yet a continuation of multi-line programs and no
more rigorous regulation.
?  In South Africa, after a decade of modest growth and success, the non-profit/NGO
carrier has recently encountered unsustainably high claims/loss ratios and
operating costs and the possibility that an essential international reinsurance
agreement may not be renewed.  An NGO may have fewer options than either the
government or a rated insurance firm in securing a fresh infusion of capital to
sustain it’s rating and expand its writing capacity.
?  In The Philippines, after 50 years of ongoing operations, the government-
sponsored MI experienced heavy claims and losses and a depleted balance sheet.
Unable to continue writing, it temporarily suspended writing new coverage,
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pending the receipt of a substantial new capital infusion from the government and
the elimination of that portion of the program causing the heaviest concentration
of claims.  These unprecedented problems were attributable in part to economic
instability, but more specifically to the insurance of large development-related
loans.  Despite the program’s full government guaranty, large volumes of claims
went unpaid during the program’s suspension and are only now gradually being
paid— partly in cash and partly with government credits and paper.
Some useful inferences for the Russian Federation can be drawn from this international
experience with mortgage default insurance, including:
?  The success or failure of a mortgage default insurance program cannot be
established until it has faced and survived a major economic downturn.
?  The closer that an MI program adheres to its main mission of supporting
homeownership (that is, insuring loans secured by individual owner-occupied
dwelling units), the more stable it will remain in times of adversity.
?  While empowering lenders to make high LTV home loans is the historic and
continuing justification for MI, determining what is the maximum prudent LTV
ratio to be offering and insuring is best approached in a progressive, experience-
based manner, rather than over-reaching and assuming excessive risks at the
outset.
?  MI pricing must be actuarially based and maintained at levels that will be self-
sustaining over the long term.  A false sense of well being that prevails in upward
trending markets should not be the basis for reducing MI tariffs.
?  Government should establish a supportive regulatory environment— both in
banking and insurance— to guard against adverse selection of risk and to create a
proper match between high risk-high LTV loans and the use of MI to offset this
risk.
?  Government insurance regulations need to recognize the unique nature of
mortgage insurance risk and as such, establish laws and regulations that will apply
equally to all participants in order to assure that an MI’s claim paying capability is
not compromised over time.
?  A government guaranty alone gives no absolute assurance that when adversity
strikes, all claims will be paid as anticipated and agreed.
?  Default risks covered by MI need to be shared with originating lenders in such a
way that lenders face some contingent risk exposure on loans not properly
underwritten or serviced.
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Chapter 3
Mortgage Insurance Readiness – Scorecard for the Russian Federation
This Chapter assesses a number of functional areas relating to housing finance that will
impact the feasibility, implementation, and ultimately, the success of a mortgage
insurance provider in the Russian Federation.  This assessment is based upon current
conditions as we understand them— conditions that could change fairly quickly— and
presumably improve— over time.  Some current conditions are less than ideal for MI.
While certain of these issues may be worked around to some extent, there are others that
we believe need corrective action prior to introducing mortgage insurance.
Based upon a review of recent studies of housing finance in Russia, combined with the
results of our own recent personal visit and interviews in Moscow, we have assigned
ratings ranging from '1' to '5' that are designed to depict the state of readiness for MI in
the Russian Federation.  These ratings are defined as follows:
 
?  A '5' rating signifies 'fully ready'
?  A '4' rating signifies 'mostly ready'
?  A '3' rating signifies 'somewhat ready'
?  A '2' rating signifies 'mostly not ready'
?  A '1' rating signifies 'not ready at all'. 
 
As detailed below (and as summarized in Appendix B) we have applied the above rating
scheme to a wide range of topics that, in our opinion, will be germane to the successful
development and operation of a MI program.  (Note: the paragraph numbering scheme in
this Chapter matches the sequence and content of functional areas summarized in
Appendix B.)
1.0   Information
1.1  Market information. Little mortgage market information was available at
the time of our review. The Realtors Association did provide some information
regarding Moscow housing market activity, primarily related to the resale of
existing units. Countrywide market information, including data on the new and
existing housing markets, is not available. We understand that there is a concerted
effort under way to quantify past and current mortgage lending volume and
activity, as well as to provide an ongoing collection of this information.
Readiness Assessment: 2
1.2  Mortgage lending performance. Practically no information was available at
the time of our review.  The government task force, under the direction of the
Center for Strategic Development, plans to begin the regular collection of
residential mortgage lending volume and activity from the banks.  We understand
also that the Central Bank has recently begun to collect mortgage lending
19
information from banks.  Appendix C contains a list of loan level mortgage data
elements that we believe should be reported to achieve the results the Central
Bank expects, and to provide the necessary data to price mortgage insurance.
Readiness Assessment: 2
1.3  Definitions – Residential Lending.  Little standardized terminology or
lending definitions exists for the industry.  Efforts underway by the Central Bank
to collect loan level data and require the banks to provide mortgage activity
reporting will be a critical step in resolving the lack of consistent industry terms.
Industry associations— especially the Russian Banks Association— should
encourage their members to work toward standardization.  At this time, loan level
mortgage data has not been collected or reported to the Central Bank. In order for
the Central Bank to require reporting of loan level mortgage data, common
industry definitions will first have to be agreed upon.
   Readiness Assessment: 1
1.4  Pricing Model data requirements. No market information was available at
the time of our review.  The effort that is currently underway to quantify and
report mortgage lending volume and activity may help to some degree.  The
mortgage lending market in the Russian Federation is new (not seasoned) and,
therefore, lacks the requisite historical experience to be able to develop any long-
term market trends and patterns necessary to design useful pricing models.  As
noted above, Appendix C contains recommendations for CBR loan level mortgage
reporting.  Some of these data items, including origination data and subsequent
loan performance histories, should start being collected as soon as possible in
order that a prospective mortgage insurer can analyze annual development of
defaults and losses for each loan origination year (“book of business”).
Readiness Assessment:  1
2.0   Political and Social
2.1  Political initiatives and attitudes.  President Putin and the DUMA recently
have given housing finance a high priority.  Over the past decade a number of far-
reaching federal enabling laws have been passed to create a foundation for private
sector-driven housing and mortgage markets.  At present, considerable activity is
under way by various government departments and the banking industry.  Public
and private officials are seeking to identify and address impediments that are
interfering with mortgage lending growth and development.  Task Force efforts to
obtain relevant market information and identify legislative actions needed to
facilitate mortgage-lending growth are positive steps.
Readiness Assessment: 4
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2.2  Government housing policy.  The Federal Government of Russia clearly
understands how a viable residential housing market can stimulate the economy
and improve its citizens’ lives.  The Center for Strategic Development is leading
the policy development efforts for the Government and has actively involved the
private sector in its initiatives.  The Government seems generally supportive of
initiatives to improve upon current laws, bureaucratic processes and costs that are
impeding the growth of mortgage finance.  Less clear, however, is whether
regional and local governments are as willing to undertake needed reforms.
Readiness Assessment: 3
2.3  Social environment. The social environment needs significant improvement,
particularly with respect to gaining the public’s trust in financial institutions.
Additionally, the consensus belief (apparently enshrined in the law at present) that
all citizens have a right to housing creates a significant problem for lenders seek-
ing to secure loans made for the purpose of home purchase. The apparent inability
to foreclose and recover the collateral property severely limits the value of that
collateral in helping to reduce the lender’s risk.  In turn, lenders’ higher risks are
ultimately passed along to all borrowers in the form of higher financing costs.
.
Readiness Assessment: 2
3.0   Regulation and Legal
3.1  Regulation of banks by the Central Bank of Russia.  The Central Bank
generally employs the Basle Accords in its regulatory process, under which bank
capital adequacy standards are nominally being met in Russia.  Periodic financial
audits reportedly are reasonably effective.  The frequency and efficacy of on-site
examinations, however, are reportedly less than fully effective.  Many banks are
part of industrial conglomerates in which their financial and operating status can
be not fully transparent.  Bank accounting standards at present also are reportedly
inconsistent.  Regarding residential mortgage loans, both the Central Bank and
Standard & Poor’s agree that this asset— even at 70 percent LTV— at present is
no less risky for the banks than are business and commercial loans.
Readiness Assessment: 3
3.2  Regulation of insurance.  The insurance industry is substantially smaller and
less developed than the banking industry.  Regulation of the insurance industry is
currently performed under the direction of the Minister of Finance.  Insurance law
is only applicable for defining acceptable types of insurance.  The Minister of
Finance promulgates, as it deems necessary, rules and regulations as part of the
process of granting a charter.
Readiness Assessment: 2
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3.3  Regulation for mortgage insurance. No specific mortgage insurance law or
regulation exists.  Mortgage insurance regulation, under ideal circumstances,
would have its own separate set of rules, as does life insurance, due to the unique
nature of the risk.  Minimum capital, required reserves, case basis loss reserves,
risk-to-capital ratio, investment restrictions and audit requirements should be
codified by legislation.  Currently, by direction of the Minister of Finance, special
mortgage insurance rules could be implemented fairly quickly.  The disadvantage
with this method of regulation, however, is that the rules could also be changed
after a mortgage insurer had agreed to commit risk capital and do business under
more stringent rules than those that might be imposed upon a subsequent market
entrant.  Absent the assurance of a “level playing field”, it will be difficult to
attract any foreign capital, because of the unusually long term financial
commitment required of a mortgage insurer.  Foreign investors will need
assurance that any future entrants will be subjected to the same rules.
Readiness Assessment: 1
3.4  Laws. A number of existing laws will need to be changed in order to improve
the prospects for mortgage lending growth— and the advent of MI— in the
Russian Federation.   Among the areas most in need of legislative attention:
?     Changes in existing laws to specify that the property is the banks’
collateral, recoverable in the event of a default by the borrower.
?  The current law allows the borrower discretionary access to escrow
account funds.  The borrower also has the personal choice whether or not
to make required annual tax or insurance payments.  If the bank holding
the mortgage contract requires an escrow account and any shortfall
occurs, the bank is required to post a reserve provision in an amount
equal to 20 percent of the loan balance.
?  The non-transferability of insurance coverages when the loan is sold (in
the system of insurance, so-called “entrepreneurial risk”).
?  A change in the “right to housing” philosophy imbedded in most of the
current laws.
Readiness Assessment: 1
3.5  Court system.  Basically, the courts’ ability to enforce mortgage contracts is
untested to date.   A judicial review has been requested by at least one mortgage
lender in all three jurisdictions to ascertain the probability of achieving a
successful foreclosure or other method of collateral recovery.  The courts’
response has been generally positive, provided, however, that the lender would
agree to provide the borrower with alternative housing as a condition of the
eviction and recovering the collateral property.  In a number of regions and
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localities, the local authorities apparently control a supply of municipal housing
that could be used for this purpose.  Private banks, however, may be less able to
adopt this alternative remedy without the agreement of the municipal
governments.
Readiness Assessment: 1
4.0  Primary Mortgage Market
4.1  Bank lending practices.  Some banks appear to have functioning home
mortgage lending programs, although most of Russia’s 1300 banks do not.
Lending requirements are somewhat conservative, which is understandable given
the current legal environment.  The banks could help themselves by sharing
information more freely, particularly credit information.  Standardization of loan
origination documents would assist in the sale and servicing (and eventually the
insuring) of mortgage loans.  Market activity reporting would assist banks in
determining their relative success in their local markets.
Readiness Assessment: 3
4.2  Insurance product acceptance. The domestic insurance industry reportedly
is undercapitalized, particularly when compared to the banking sector.  The
monoline structure of mortgage insurance and the high initial capital requirements
may make it difficult for a domestic private insurer to enter the MI business, even
if it were willing to take on the added risks relating to lack of experience data.
However, at least one domestic insurer does appear willing to assume risks
relating to the builder’s non-completion of a project by offering the bank
borrower payment guaranty coverage on the borrower’s loan during the period
that the building is under construction.  Regarding mortgage default insurance in
particular, we received a mixed, but on balance positive, response from banks
regarding its need and likely usefulness.  We received a generally positive
response to this same question when asked of government officials and secondary
market people.
            Readiness Assessment:  3
4.3  Property title (ownership) evidence.  A form of title insurance is available,
but normally it is offered as part of a three-coverage residential financing package
that also includes life and disability insurance and property hazard insurance.
Although title insurance is not generally offered as a stand-alone product, some
insurers have priced title insurance separately and will provide it when requested
by the banks.   Ability to provide evidence of ownership appears to be more of a
timeliness issue than a legal problem, due to the slow registration process.  One
problem, however, is that ownership rights to the land underlying most housing
does not seem to be free and clear (e.g., “fee simple”) but, rather, is subject to a
mixed bundle of rights shared with the municipal government, and may even be
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subject to reversion back to the local government.
Readiness Assessment: 2
4.4  Property title and lien registration (transaction costs).  Registration of
ownership and lien transfers generally are difficult, slow and, in some
jurisdictions— most notably Moscow City— rather expensive.  The municipal
registration office in Moscow is reported to be particularly understaffed and
inefficient.  In Moscow, the cost for a builder to register a newly constructed flat
can run two percent of the recorded purchase cost.  Registration-related expense
items for the purchaser include the municipal registration fee, notary fee (1 to 2.5
percent), seller/buyer agreement registration and loan assignment fees.  In
Moscow City, the municipal registration fee is about USD$200, but this and other
transaction fees generally are much lower in other areas.  While there are some
high cost exceptions, we find that direct transaction costs in the Russian
Federation are high, but not unreasonable overall for a developing market.  They
would not present a serious impediment to the conduct of a MI program.  Process
delays and uncertainties, however, would create difficulties.
Readiness Assessment: 2
4.5  Credit reporting bureau.  There is no credit bureau in the Russian
Federation and no apparent sharing of credit information amongst the banks.
Each bank evaluates credit applications in accordance with its own underwriting
procedures and rules and gathers information directly on each borrower applicant.
Generally, the banks’ credit underwriting appears to be conservative, which is
understandable.  One impediment to improved mortgage lending practices,
apparently, is an existing law that prohibits the sharing of personal credit
information between banks without the borrower’s written consent.
Readiness Assessment: 1
4.6  Real estate appraisals. We were unable to meet directly with a real estate
appraiser during our visit to Moscow.  The banks, realtors and the secondary loan
purchasers did not express any appraisal-related issues.  The banks pre-approve
outside appraisal firms that do an independent valuation for each home loan
application.  Progress has been made in setting professional and analytical
standards for appraisers, including a professional certification process.  However,
lack of access to a reliable database of comparable sales transactions makes
reliable valuations problematic, except on standardized new construction.
Readiness Assessment: 3
4.7  Real estate brokers. Real estate sales agent fees, reportedly ranging widely
from two to ten percent, are generally in line with other countries.  Many sales
agents appear to be providing extra services to buyers by guiding them through
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the purchasing and documentation process and directing them to an appropriate
lender when necessary.  Brokers may  be less involved with new construction
builders and/or the project investors take a more direct role in the sale of their
units.  Broker practices that are adverse to the buyers’ interests are apparently
rather commonplace.
Readiness Assessment: 3
4.8  Builders and developers.  This is a problem area.  Some builder practices
employed in the selling of new units can put the unwary buyer in considerable
jeopardy.  Buyers are being required to deposit nearly half of the cost of the unit,
but only as an investment in the builder’s project.  When (if) the unit is
completed, then the buyer may be able to obtain an ownership right, if he/she
comes up with the full balance, generally due in 30 to 60 days.  The final purchase
cost may be higher than originally stated, based on the builder’s subsequent
completion costs.  Additionally, the price for the unit does not include interior
improvements such as cabinets, utilities, flooring treatments or other fixtures.
These additional costs to the buyer reportedly can run up to 20 percent or more of
the contract purchase price.  Builders are forced to devise methods of financing
their construction, in part because most banks are reluctant to extend them
construction loans.  Also, developers are granted the land to build on by the
municipal governments under 49 year leases.  Since the builder does not own the
land outright, it cannot be used as good collateral for financing the building’s
construction.  The current building boom, at least in the Moscow area, may be
headed for a bust, in the view of several bankers whom we interviewed.
Readiness Assessment: 1
4.9  Property maintenance services.   Most existing apartment owners rely upon
the municipal governments to provide common area maintenance services for
their buildings.  The exceptions are the newer buildings where the municipal
government either has required the owners to provide their own maintenance or
the owners have organized themselves to do so.  Standardized covenants,
conditions and restrictions (CC&R’s)— a legal framework for building and
common area management, such as exists in the U.S. and other more developed
housing markets— have not been widely adopted in Russia.  Also, individual flat
owners in many buildings do not appear to have a strong sense of pride in
ownership relative to the common areas of their buildings.  While the current
system works, more or less, clear definition of responsibilities and owner control
is lacking.
Readiness Assessment: 3
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5.0   Secondary Support Systems
5.1  Industry associations.  Banking, realtor and appraiser associations exist, but
their primary purpose is aligned toward how to conduct business and some
political initiatives.  There does not yet appear to be any real sharing of
information or efforts toward standardization of documents and standards.
            Readiness Assessment: 3
5.2  Secondary market. There is an active, though limited, secondary market.
Loans are being originated and sold by several banks to various regional
(government-sponsored) mortgage agencies and the Agency for Home Mortgage
Lending (AHML).  Underwriting guidelines determining the loan’s’ eligibility for
purchase are conservative, with the maximum LTV typically being 70 percent.
With most secondary investment being limited to annual government budgetary
allocations, growth potential will be constricted, pending changes that will induce
private market capital to invest at competitive rates of return.
Readiness Assessment: 3
5.3  Foreign investor interest.  Several foreign banks and insurers currently are
active in Russia but are still subject to significant restrictions.  Private foreign
capital for a mortgage insurance operation will not be forthcoming until special
regulations have been adopted specifically for mortgage insurance and
foreclosure-related issues are addressed.  Furthermore, banks need to be
motivated to avoid adverse selection of the risks submitted to mortgage insurers.
The lack of mortgage lending data is an impediment, but it is far less important
than the need to change laws and regulations, establish predictable judicial
practices, and reform how local government releases land for development.
Readiness Assessment: 2.
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Chapter 4
Mortgage Insurance Pricing
Introduction.
The pricing of mortgage insurance risks cannot be done independently of the mortgage
insurer’s adherence to its stated underwriting standards and compliance with its insured lender
approval criteria.  The Premium Model, in essence, is a component part of an operating
framework that works in conjunction with these standards.
?  Insured guidelines.  Financial institutions (Insured Lenders) that are approved by the
mortgage insurer are initially issued a Master Policy.  The Master Policy defines the
terms and conditions of coverage governing all individual certificates of insurance that
are issued by the mortgage insurer for the benefit of the Insured Lender.  In order for
the Insured Lender to obtain a Master Policy, it must meet the financial and operating
performance criteria established by the MI provider.
?  Underwriting guidelines.   Implementation of prudent underwriting risk acceptance
criteria by the mortgage insurer with respect to the insurer’s loan approval or rejection
process will have a major impact on the quality of the insured loan portfolio and its
ultimate performance over time.  A mortgage insurer’s failure to adhere to its own
mortgage insurer’s underwriting rules and guidelines, by approving an excessive
number of exceptions, will produce a higher risk insured portfolio than was assumed in
the pricing model.
Methodology
The performance of several bank residential loan portfolios by individual year of origination
(“Book Year”) should be analyzed to determine the following three trends that are necessary to
calculate the mortgage insurance premium rates for that residential lending market:
?  Insured loan persistency
?  Default frequency
?  Loss severity
A Book Year of total business typically would be analyzed for pricing purposes by classifying
that total “book of business” into groups of loans having similar characteristics.  These
groupings, for example, typically would include loans originated in the same calendar year,
and having the same loan-to-value ratio (LTV), loan term, type of mortgage instrument (e.g.
fixed or variable) and occupancy status.  Individual loans having distinctly different
characteristics (e.g., property types, loan amounts) that are outside of the normal range may
need to be excluded before proceeding with the analysis. Depending on any unique market
characteristics, additional criteria may be required to segregate accurately the loans in each
Book Year in order to project expected future loan performance.
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Insured loan persistency (“runoff rate”) The Book Year data is analyzed to determine the
persistency pattern of the original book of insured loans.  Persistency is defined as the number
of insured loans remaining in force at each future anniversary date— or end of each future
calendar quarter--expressed as a percentage of the total loans originated for the respective
Book Year.  The Book Year’s number (and value) of pre-payments, payoffs plus defaults, and
other terminations of insurance coverage are determined for each year or quarter as the book of
loans ages.  Analysis of several Book Years with similar characteristics should reveal a
consistent pattern, after being adjusted for any abnormal market behavior during the analysis
period.  Based on this data, the modeler should be able to calculate the expected number and
value of the original book year of loans that will be in force (persist) at the end of each
calendar quarter or year over the full life of that portfolio segment.
Persistency patterns are needed to determine both the amount and timing of future premium
revenues, as well as the amount and timing of future losses.  (Note that insurance coverage on
a loan may not persist as long as the loan itself in the event that coverage is terminated by the
lender while the loan itself remains outstanding.)
Default frequency.  Once the respective Book Years are segregated, the number and value of
loans that defaulted are analyzed by their age (e.g., number of months or quarters), both at the
initial point of the first missed payment (delinquency) and the age at which the loan was
terminated from the lender’s books (default).  This default age may correspond to the point in
time when the collateral was acquired by the lender or was resold to a third party, either via
foreclosure proceedings, or by some other negotiated means.  Delinquent loans that become
current (“cured”) should be tracked separately as a subset of current loans.  Technically
speaking, these loans are current.  However, experience in other countries shows that up to 25
percent of the currently delinquent loans over the life of each Book Year will be repeat
delinquencies.
Default frequency is important in projecting the number of expected claims, but also in
allocating an appropriate “case basis” loss reserve for delinquent loans outstanding.  The
process used to project the age of the delinquency and the age at which the loan is removed
from the lender’s books can also be used to project the claim settlement date.  The loan
termination date is the date at which the lender no longer has an outstanding loan on its books.
Loss severity.  The severity of the loss (expressed as the average amount of loss per claim paid)
is determined by adding:
?  The lender’s total unpaid principal balance
?  Legal expenses
?  All other costs (except penalty charges)
?  Delinquent interest accrued by from the time of the initial delinquency through loan
termination (by foreclosure or other means)
From this sum, which is the total amount owed to the lender, is then subtracted any net proceeds
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realized from reselling the property (or, alternatively, the expected sale value based upon an
appraisal).  Estimated costs relating to the foreclosure process and other legal proceedings that
are required to obtain a clear and unencumbered title are needed to establish an adequate
mortgage insurance loss provision.  Typical costs for each Book Year portfolio segment having
similar characteristics can be averaged to project the average loss severity.  As noted above,
however, it is critical that each Book Year’s loan classifications exclude anomalies such as:
?  Extremely high or low loan-to-value ratios
?  Abnormal mortgage instrument or loan terms
?  Non-occupancy of the insured property
?  Unusually large small loan amounts
?  Extreme geographic concentrations
Exhibit 4-1 below illustrates Book Year patterns for Insured Loan Persistency (as a percent of
the original book) and the maximum points at which Default and Claim Frequency may occur,
hypothetically.  In later years the claim frequency will diminish as a result of equity buildup in
the property.  However; borrowers may still become delinquent due to income interruptions.
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Additional Pricing Considerations
Financing terms.  Different types of financing instrument –that is, mortgage loan products—
will produce default results that can be drastically different, even for similar borrowers under
similar economic conditions.  For example, loans with negative amortization can increase,
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rather than reduce, the outstanding loan balance over time and, therefore, erode the borrowers’
equity.  A lack of property appreciation to offset this equity erosion can further increase the
probability of default.  The amount of borrower equity at any point in time has proven to be a
strong determinant of willingness to repay.
Likewise, financing instruments that contain a “balloon” repayment provision without
providing for refinancing present borrowers with a payment due amounts that will likely
exceed their ability to pay, thereby resulting in default.
Adjustable rate loans without reasonable caps or limits on interest rate and payment increases
can, in a rising interest rate environment, increase the borrowers; payments to levels beyond
their ability to meet the scheduled repayments (“payment shock”).
Owner occupancy.  Pricing in the context of this study only considers mortgage insurance
pricing for owner occupied property.  Non-owner occupied, or investor-owned, property
presents a significantly greater default risk and would require higher premium rates than for
owner occupied properties, as well as more stringent underwriting guidelines.  Investor-owned
residential dwellings (defined in the U.S. as one-to-four family buildings) have a historical
default rate about three times that of owner occupied dwellings.  These higher default rates
occur in spite of the imposition of more restrictive underwriting guidelines, lower LTV
requirements, and the use of an income-based underwriting approach.  Retail and commercial
properties, as well as construction loans, fall beyond the scope of residential mortgage
insurance and should not be insured by a monoline residential mortgage insurer.
Regional pricing.  Pricing for this analysis does not contemplate any regional pricing
variation.  Based on the vastly different geographic areas of the Russian Federation, it may be
plausible to consider development of MI prices determined by additional regional economic
factors.  Some areas may exhibit a consistently higher or lower frequency of default than
others due their economic situation, industry concentrations, building materials, or even
climate considerations.  Before regional pricing variations are considered, however, there
should be compelling evidence that the risk variances are enduring over a long time period
and, also, that the primary and secondary market users of MI both want and need regional
pricing differences.  (In the U.S., for example, it has long been the public policy of the FHA to
offer a uniform nationwide mortgage insurance premium.)
Premium Model – Description for the Russian Federation
Caveats.  Mortgage insurance pricing calculations in this Report have been made, recognizing that
there is practically no experience regarding foreclosure frequency or loss severity in Russia.
Additionally, current laws exist in the Russian Federation that would render the claim payment
assumptions used in most standard mortgage insurance pricing models to be invalid without a
change to the current foreclosure laws, and most likely, a less costly and expedited process for
transferring property titles and mortgage loans.
Alternatively, a mortgage insurance default pricing scheme based on the premise that no collateral
recovery is possible could be produced, but as a practical matter, such a scheme would have to be
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considered “credit insurance” rather than “mortgage default insurance” which, in turn, would raise
questions regarding the credit analysis process and credit information availability.  Our pricing
model assumptions are presented in Appendix D with the understanding that the reliability of data
is extremely low.
“Standard loan”.  Mortgage insurance pricing assumptions in this report are based upon a
“standard” Russian Federation loan, defined as
?  First lien, residential property
?  Loan term, 10 years
?  Fixed interest rate, fixed payment schedule
?  Insured LTV Ratio 85% (Benchmark uninsured LTV ratio = 70%
?  30% (top tier) mortgage insurance coverage.
Market scenarios.  Calculated premium rates are weighted by market scenarios.  The Model
employs three market scenarios, each with a different risk profile are defined for the country:
?  A positive economic environment, denoted as “low risk”
?  A moderate risk environment, denoted as “expected risk” and
?  A negative economic environment, denoted as “severe risk”
These three scenarios, each yielding a separate premium value, are utilized in a weighted manner to
determine the premium actually displayed in the Model output.  The Pricing Model assigns the
positive and negative risk scenarios at 25 percent weight each, and the expected market risk scenario
at 50 percent weight.  The resultant mortgage insurance premium calculation shown reflects this
weighted average.
The logic for the weighted pricing calculation approach stems from the required long-term
commitment to the quoted price, i.e., for the full term of the loan.  Unlike insurance premiums for
auto or property insurance, MI premiums do not change over the life of the loan.  At the same time,
the mortgage insurer must anticipate what future mortgage market conditions are likely to be.  Thus,
over the life of any given cohort of loans insured, market conditions are likely to vary from good to
poor in accordance with business cycles and/or economic downturns and recoveries, including
possibly severe economic stress and plummeting home values.  In this sense, the premium rate must
represent an “average” price that can maintain the mortgage insurer’s financial strength over time.
Pricing Model Cost Components.
The pricing model cost components can be divided into three general categories:
?  Underwriting and acquisition costs
?  Claim costs
?  Financial costs
Underwriting and acquisition cost assumptions.  These are the costs to obtain and maintain the
mortgage insurance policies on the mortgage insurer’s books.  Premium and or income taxes, if
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applicable, are included as an acquisition expense.
?  Underwriting expenses to obtain and put the MI policies on the books.  This portion of
premium is expressed in basis points and is based on an expected insurance volume level
for an ongoing mortgage insurance provider.  (Note that the basis point costs are not
sufficient to cover expenses that will be incurred by a mortgage insurer during the first
several years of its operation, due to the lack of insurance volume— therefore premium
revenue--during its startup phase.
?  Renewal expenses to maintain the policies on the books.  This portion of the premium is
an allocation for administrative expenses. (This amount also is not adequate for a startup
company.)
?  Taxes. The current corporate tax rate for Russian insurance companies is 20 percent of
net income. The Pricing Model assumes 4 percent of premium written as the tax rate.
Assuming that a 20 percent profit target is achieved, then a 20 percent income tax rate,
based on net income (profit before tax), would be 4 percent of the gross premium income
written.
Pricing model claim cost assumptions.  These input variables attempt to quantify the “severity” of
an average mortgage insurance loss, taking account of the mortgage insurance coverage percentage.
These costs include: delinquent interest (number of months); legal and foreclosure costs (expressed
as a percent of the loan amount); property taxes and property insurance (also as a percent of the loan
amount); and the maintenance costs for the property while in the foreclosure process (expressed as a
percent of the property value).
?  Delinquent interest rate is based on the current market interest rate ranges.  The time in
months from first default to completion of the foreclosure sale is unknown.  The laws
and regulations in Russia appear to lack sufficient clarity such that the expectation of a
timely and efficient foreclosure sale is highly doubtful at this time.  No actual experience
is available to determine either the time required or the likely amount  of legal expenses
and court costs.
?  Delinquent taxes and insurance payments made by the Insured Lender during the
period of borrower delinquency.  These amounts are based on the number of months
from the initial delinquency to the date of the foreclosure sale, or other means of property
conveyance by the borrower.
?  Expenses incurred by the Insured Lender for maintenance and security of the property
during the period of delinquency and foreclosure.  This is based on the number of months
from initial default to the date of the foreclosure sale or other means of property
conveyance by the borrower.
?  Property salvage value.  This is a critical component for the mitigation of a mortgage
insurer’s loss.  The projected net realizable value of 70 percent of original sales price is
based on an estimate of the sale price that could be realized in the event of a distressed
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property sale.  Net realizable value is the proceeds received from the sale of the property,
less any real estate sales commissions, property transfer taxes, property registration fees
and any other items that are customarily paid by the seller of the property to effect the
transfer of ownership.  The actual factor for Russia is unknown.
Financial cost assumptions.   The mortgage insurer’s cost for the use of funds, the expected return
on the insurer’s invested capital (if a private firm), projected premium cash flows, timing of losses
and operating profit targets all are financial cost components of the mortgage insurance premium.
?  Discount rate.  The interest rate at which banks are charged to obtain funds from the
Central Bank
?  Investment income rate of return.  The expected rate of return on the mortgage
insurer’s risk capital. The estimated rate of return is based on the current lending rates of
the Central Bank.
?  Risk-to-capital ratio. The amount of capital required to support the mortgage insurer’s
risk.1
?  Return on required capital.  The indicated profit margin was selected to reflect a
private mortgage insurer’s target. If the proposed MI provider is a government-sponsored
insurer, then the target return may be lower.   But the objective of being a self-sustaining
entity would necessitate the establishment of some rate of return on portfolio investment
to remain viable for the long term.
Default Probabilities and Adjustment Factors in the Premium Model.
Default curve assumptions.  The frequency of defaults in the Premium Model is a function of the
factors indicated above.  As noted previously, there is virtually no experience with mortgage
defaults in Russia.  Similarly, there are not yet any long-term data, or even very long-term loans.
Nor are the data yet available on a  “book year” basis, which is the actuarial format underlying the
principal types of mortgage insurance premium models.  Thus, the ability to actuarially develop MI
premiums based on existing data in Russia – at least with any amount of confidence – simply does
not exist today.
Under these circumstances, a “second best” alternative has been employed in calculating the
preliminary premium rates for this Report.  United States data on the default behavior of loans with
different terms and different LTV levels has been utilized as a beginning point in the model.  The
U.S. databases containing this information are the largest and most complete worldwide.  Default
probabilities are calculated on the basis of aggregating many “book years” of experience over many
varied economic conditions.  Typically, default curves for long-term mortgage loans are in the shape
of an upside down U-curve, or “bell curve”, with a longer right hand “tail”.  That is, default
probabilities are quite low during the earlier years of most loans, then increase to a high point after a
                                               
1.  The minimum requirement for U.S. mortgage insurers is 25-to-1, which is the value
used in this Pricing Model.
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few years into the loan term, and then gradually decline to very low default rates as the loan term
ages significantly— reflecting both equity buildup and extended borrower repayment experience.
Default curve adjustment - Loss scaling factor.   The U.S. default probability curves in the
Premium Model can be adjusted across-the-board, using a “loss scaling factor” to reflect differing
default rate expectations for Russia.  This type of international loss curve adjusting, while far from
ideal, can be used to accelerate the introduction of MI until such time as a database of domestic
mortgage performance experience becomes available.
The Premium Model book year loss ratio has been set, for the purposes of this exercise, such that the
default rate for Russia is 4 ½ times greater (loss scaling factor) than the expected US default rate
frequency curve indicates for similar loans.  This is the equivalent of a 6.0 percent book year default
rate. The mortgage and foreclosure laws for Russia are considerably less favorable for both loss
mitigation and the introduction of MI and, as such, justify a significantly higher loss frequency
projection.  Additionally; this adjustment also establishes the low risk default rate for the Russia
pricing as being equal to the moderate default rate (expected) in Kazakhstan.  The mortgage and
foreclosure laws for Kazakhstan are considerably more favorable toward the introduction of MI.
However, Kazakhstan also lacks any significant amount of default experience.  The  “reference
values” used as the data inputs for the Premium Model pricing calculations are shown in Appendix
D.  Note also that book year default rates generally are higher than “portfolio” default rates.  The
portfolio default rate, which is the usual statistic cited by banks, is an “average” value calculated
using all loans in the portfolio for the period, regardless of the book year in which they were
originated.  When portfolios are growing, the disproportionate amount of newer “unseasoned” loans
will tend to understate the average default rate relative to true Book Year default rates.
Reference values used in the Premium Model.  As discussed, there are a fairly large number of
user input variables in the Premium Model.  In order to make consistent comparisons using the
Model, an initial set of values has been selected for each of the three above-described market
scenarios.  These values reflect current market conditions, as we understand them, as well as input
values provided through our recent on-site interviews.  The majority of input variables are in reality
a “best guess” at this point in time, based on our knowledge about how a mortgage insurer should
operate and our expectations as a result of our findings.  Any of these values can be changed as the
modeler desires, but comparative pricing analyses will be more instructive when a single set of
reference values can be established initially.  The set of reference values used by the modeler is
shown in Appendix D.
Russia’s own loan level data.  It must be stressed that the default curves and the resulting default
probabilities for each year of a book year of loans of a given LTV, as well as loan term and other
characteristics, will need to be developed specifically for Russia.  This is clearly a long-term
endeavor, but an important one. Thus, this Report also includes detailed recommendations regarding
the type of data and loan information that needs to be collected over time, so that future premium
rate decisions reflect more precisely the actual experience of the market (see Appendix C).  The
Central Bank, in its capacity as bank regulator, will need to play the key role in this process if a
robust loan level database is to become a reality in Russia.
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Indicated Premium Rates.
The Premium Model can generate numerous alternative prices based on the loan term, loan-to-value
ratio, and coverage percent for each set of input variables.   We recommend, however, that insured
lenders not be offered a large number of tariff options, particularly at the outset.  Rather, we would
advise that the MI tariff structure be kept simple during introductory phase.
The premium rates that have been calculated for this Report, based upon another country’s distinct
laws and market environment, are only illustrative as to what such rates might look like in the
Russian Federation. Indicated MI rates for the Russian Federation are based on the foregoing
assumptions and caveats, as applied to a “standard” insured loan defined as:
?  Loan-to-value ratio up to 85%
?  MI coverage of first 30% of loan amount
?  Loan Term 10 years.
?  Fixed interest rate and fixed payment
?  Owner occupied residential dwelling unit
The indicted annual premium payment  would  be .93% of the outstanding loan balance.
The indicated equivalent prepaid single  premium rate would be 3.60% of the initial loan balance.
An extensive listing of single and annual mortgage insurance premium rates, defined by their
respective loan-to-value and coverage guaranty percentages, appears in Appendix E.
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Chapter 5
Findings and Recommendations
Findings
The following findings, each relevant to the near term prospects and need for mortgage
default insurance in Russia, are based upon interviews we conducted with knowledgeable
persons during our recent visit to Moscow, combined with our review of recent reports on
the state of housing and mortgage finance in the Russian Federation.
1. The Russian Federation is a very large and diverse country that would provide an
MI program with an opportunity to achieve excellent geographic and market risk
dispersion.  Current lending activity, however, is quite concentrated
geographically in a few major cities.
2. The current mortgage origination market is negligible when measured both in
relative and absolute terms (estimated at 30 to 50 billion rubles / USD $1.0 to
$1.7 billion, or about 0.1 to 0.2 percent of GDP).  From this small base, however,
the prospective growth rates for both home sales and mortgage lending volume
are exceedingly high.
3. Growth in lending volume is restrained by a combination of attitudes and
customs, high risks and financing costs, restrictive and poorly working laws,
physical production constraints, minimal incentives to lend, and lack of
competition.
4. The national homeownership rate is high— higher, in fact, than that of the U.S. at
67 percent.  Most owned dwelling units, however, are apartments that were given
by the government to their then-resident occupants.  Over 75 percent of Russian
households say that they want better housing.
5. A large share of the existing national housing stock is physically deteriorated or
dilapidated; much in urgent need of repair and much even beyond repair.
6. Some high LTV lending (nominally up to 95 percent LTV) already is being done
without benefit of MI.  Although the true borrower equity for most of these loans
probably is well over 5 percent (perhaps as high as 20 to 25 percent), this lending
could be risky if the economy, along with home prices, were to soften.
7. Builders and real estate sales agents currently control a strong “seller’s market”
that is not especially good for homebuyers.  The banks’ ability to offer cost-
competitive mortgage financing would improve the consumer’s standing and
greatly expand home affordability.  Even the current 70 percent LTV benchmark,
if offered at affordable rates, would require far less cash from buyers than the
prevailing builders’ investment participation schemes.
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8. There is a large gap between the supply and demand for housing in Russia.  Too
rapid expansion of mortgage financing availability (i.e., housing demand),
however, could be counterproductive and inflationary unless accompanied by
near-term improvements on the housing supply side.  Supply side problems
include restrictive, monopolistic and non-transparent processes for municipalities’
release of land to private developers.  Issues with the supply side of the market,
however, are beyond the scope of this Report.
9. There is an overall lack of market information and data, including home sale
transactions, mortgage lending and loan performance.  In Moscow, significant
efforts are apparent to develop useful housing market information, including sales
activity and prices by geographic sector and other relevant characteristics.
10. A lack of trust among market participants seems prevalent, especially lack of
buyers’ trust in banks and financial institutions generally.
11. A straight government credit guaranty in the Russian Federation, especially when
given at the regional or municipal level, may over time exhibit the same political
and financial vulnerability as in some other developing countries.
12. The process of transferring and registering real estate ownership and mortgage
liens is slow and, in some local jurisdictions, expensive.  Transaction costs
overall, while high, are not excessive.
13. No specialized insurance regulations exist for any form of credit insurance,
including MI, although this matter is being given serious attention by the Ministry
of Trade and Economic Development.  Also, insurance regulation today is
directed ad hoc by the Ministry of Finance, rather than being extensively codified.
14. The ability to foreclose and/or evict to recover pledged collateral on a home loan
in the event of borrower default is quite restricted and unpredictable.  Whether
there is the political will to enact and enforce major reforms near term is
questionable, despite the priority being given by policymakers to the larger
subject of housing finance.
15. Basic mortgage-related laws are nominally in place, but questions and gaps
remain (e.g., restrictions on sharing borrower credit information, mortgages not
freely transferable, “entrepreneurial risk” restrictions, escrow/trustee accounts not
authorized, condominium common area ownership and governance inadequately
defined).
16. Banks and their regulators do not view home mortgage lending as a favorable risk
relative to business and commercial real estate loans.
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17. Lenders face difficulties in acquiring reliable financial and credit information on
prospective borrowers, including, but not limited to, the absence of a credit
reporting bureau.
18. Future prospects seem uncertain for the regional housing and mortgage agencies
that play such a role in today’s limited volume mortgage market.  Their budgets
are limited and their property management and land disposition activities seem
more transitional than permanent.
19. Home price trends are strong in Russia’s few largest urban areas, but the rapid
run-ups are not sustainable, and future home price trends are uncertain.  There
may be some correlation between the housing price movements (up or down) and
the price of a barrel of petroleum.
20. Current risk-sharing arrangements between the Agency for Home Mortgage
Lending (AHML), the regional agencies and private banks could be made more
efficient, with more positive incentives for the respective participants.
21. The ability to properly price many mortgage-related financial services (e.g. based
upon supply, demand, true cost, competition, and risk) appear to be limited.  A
true secondary market will not evolve until its real costs become sustainable at
levels below primary (bank) lending costs.
22. The AHML, in its mission to develop a secondary mortgage market, is addressing
many of the same mortgage market improvements that are needed to create a
favorable climate for mortgage default insurance, including: standardized
mortgage documents and underwriting practices; strong loan servicing standards;
good quality property valuations and credit reporting; better housing and
mortgage market data; further legislative and judicial reforms.
23. When compared to the banking sector in Russia, the domestic insurance sector is
weak, with respect to capitalization and strength of laws and regulation.
24. There are a small number of capable, leading edge home mortgage lenders
(banks) in Russia, mostly concentrated in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but with
plans and actions under way to build national mortgage lending branch networks.
The pool of capable managers and support staff, however, is small, considering
the size of the country and potential growth of lending volume.
25. The Moscow-based investment rating agency’s capability and performance, with
respect to its limited number of ratings of banks and other financial institutions to
date, seems remarkable, given the short length of time in operation.
26. Recent passage of deposit insurance for Russian banks signifies a major advance
toward stronger and more liquid banks, greater ability to provide funds for
primary mortgage lending volume through deposit-based lending.
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27. Current home mortgage lending is predominantly fixed rate, with little innovation
in mortgage instrument design apparent.  Notable trends are (1) moving from
USD denominated to Ruble lending, (2) lengthening of mortgage loan terms and
(3) testing of increased LTV ratios above the current 70 percent benchmark.
28. Mortgage and housing-related trade associations (e.g., bankers, realtors,
appraisers) seem to be well established. To date, however, no real progress has
been made on a critical area needed for MI, namely agreed-upon standards and
procedures for collecting loan level data on residential mortgage lending and
housing market data.  Real estate sales agent practices are still in development.
29. Appraisers have been given training by international consultants and have adopted
professional certification standards.  But the reliability of many valuations
remains in question, due to lack of comparable sales data.
30. Unregulated consumer cooperatives (few of any scale) play a useful, but small
and   probably transitional role in Russian housing finance.
31. Structured savings schemes are a useful way, absent better credit reporting, to
assess and underwrite prospective mortgage borrowers.  They can perform this
limited function without being subsidized or highly regulated.
32. Regarding justification for mortgage default insurance in the Russian Federation:
?  MI is hard to justify in the immediate near term, even if needed laws and data
were present.  There appears to be adequate mortgage funding to finance
current housing production capacity, and at least two years of bank liquidity to
fund expected loan demand.  This in essence provides the Russian Federation
with at least two years to initiate the required legislative changes required to
implement mortgage insurance.
?  In the intermediate term (two to five years), as housing production outstrips
affordability, even in a falling interest rate environment, MI may be required
to address the need for lower down payments to qualify more potential
homebuyers.  The required legislation and regulations and initial charter for
the MI fund will need to be in place prior to the actual implementation of
mortgage insurance.  It may take two years or longer to accomplish this task.
?  Longer term (over five years), MI may become an essential credit
enhancement for rated mortgage-backed securities used by primary lenders to
access secondary sources of capital.
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Recommendations
Based upon the research conducted in preparation for this Report and the Findings
presented in the preceding section, we offer the following Recommendations for
consideration by policymakers in the Russian Federation on mortgage insurance: its
purposes, prerequisite actions, timing, sponsorship, and program design features that will
be self-sustaining and will best serve the country’s housing needs.  We have made a
concerted effort to link these Russia-specific recommendations to specific aspects of
international MI experience wherever there appears to be a useful connection.
Recommendations 1 through 4 should be addressed immediately in order to make
mortgage insurance available in the Russian Federation within the next two years.
Recommendations 5 through 8 will need to be addressed in the near future, shortly after
action on Recommendations 1 through 4, in order to offer mortgage default insurance at
the earliest possible date.
1. Mortgage default insurance should not be offered in the Russian Federation until
the banks’ ability to foreclose is clarified.  Recovery and sale of the asset that has
been pledged as mortgage collateral should be established in law and must be
reliable in practice.
Views on this issue--both within and outside Russia— vary markedly.  The alternative to
this recommendation is that mortgage default insurance should be offered for the very
reason that foreclosure laws and practices in the Russian market are not functional, i.e.,
that MI should be viewed as a substitute, or a sort of palliative and hopefully temporary
method to bypass the problems caused by dysfunctional collateral recovery practices.
Avoidance of the political and very real social consternation that could occur if
foreclosure and eviction were to be made a predictable consequence of mortgage default
is not a viable long-term option.
In our view mortgage insurance should not be used to delay and/or avoid collateral
recovery reform issues in either the legal or social arenas.  Circumvention of appropriate
real estate and mortgage lending laws has never been considered as one of the benefits of
mortgage default insurance.  In fact, if MI is launched in the face of such problems, the
end result can be counterproductive: needed reforms might be delayed and the cost of
mortgage insurance without real collateral security will be excessive.
2. Before launching a MI program, the Russian Federal Government should pursue
a multifaceted legislative agenda to improve the environment in which a mortgage
insurance program would operate.  Enacting these legislative actions would increase
chances for success and enable a MI to operate more efficiently and manage its
risks.
The following subject areas, some of which have already received legislative attention,
will require definitive legislative action to facilitate a mortgage insurance operation as
well as to encourage growth in the residential mortgage market:
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Collateral recovery.  Although a federal law governing foreclosures has been enacted,
concerns remain widespread that it may not work in practice where it comes in conflict
with the Civil Law.  Collateral for mortgages taken by existing homeowners, i.e., for
home renovation or improvement, should have equal status to collateral for mortgages
used to purchase a dwelling.  A secured lender’s ability to evict, following foreclosure,
appears to be very problematic at present.
Municipal Housing Stock. Banks that are in the process of eviction and foreclosure need
to be given access to the municipal housing stock as an alternative housing option. This
may require some legislative action or agreement between the municipal governments
and the federal government for an effective implementation.
Successors and assigns rights. All rights under a mortgage agreement should be made
assignable to qualified third parties (including investors and securities holders) without
requiring the prior written approval of the borrower.  Similar transfer rights should apply
to the loan servicing and collections functions.
Legalize the transfer of mortgage default insurance protection, specifically, and all other
insurance requirements, once issued for a home mortgage loan, or group of such loans, in
order that the protection afforded is readily assignable to any third party investor that may
purchase an insured loan or pool of loans.
Escrow accounts need to be authorized by federal law.  Escrow accounts are needed to
hold various payments in a form of trust account to assure their proper and timely
payment on behalf of a third party— in this instance, the mortgage borrower.  Proposed
amendments to the Law on Collateral need to be enacted in order that various services
ancillary to residential lending— including mortgage default insurance— can be paid by
the borrower in a more cost effective manner.  Escrow accounts need to be lawfully
attached to the respective mortgage loan.  Banks should not be penalized, by having to
post a reserve, for any escrow account shortages that occur due to a borrower’s actions.
A special law authorizing credit insurance generally, and mortgage default insurance in
particular, to be chartered and regulated as a line separate and distinct from other forms
of insurance.  Comparable legislation is needed with regard to mortgage default
reinsurance.
Making a decision on the need to receive a policy of civil liability insurance under the
mortgage contract.
Municipal Land Lease.  The current practice of municipal governments, whereby they
lease the land for 49 years to developers, should be changed to an outright, competitive
sale of the land.  This would allow for title to ownership to be free and clear for the
developer, which could relieve the current developer financing difficulties as well as the
long-term homeowner concerns.  The rules and practices need to be established— by law
if necessary— in order that developers can finance housing construction and owners can
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pledge their property as good collateral.  Clear and unencumbered title is important, not
just for financing home construction and purchase, but also for home renovation, home
improvement and home resale financing.  Clarity of title is a key building block for a
soundly conceived MI program.
Credit reporting agency.  A bill has been drafted, with broad support, and resolution is
considered likely.  However, different versions are still being promoted.  The final
program should include consumer reporting of both negative and positive personal credit
histories.  Mandatory participation would be desirable, but perhaps not essential.
Deposit insurance legislation has been approved.  This type of government-sponsored
insurance is needed to enable the banks to grow their deposit-based lending programs,
which in turn, can help to grow mortgage lending volume.  Changing consumer attitudes,
which includes mistrust in financial institutions, should be helped by the federal
government’s deposit insurance.  Also, to the extent that deposit insurance may be
accompanied by strengthened bank oversight and supervision, conditions will become
more conducive for introducing MI.
3.  The Central Bank of Russia should continue to pursue its efforts to have banks
report loan level mortgage data to a central repository under the Central Bank’s
control.
Among the several benefits of such a central data bank will be that data collected over a
period of years will provide the ability to price mortgage default insurance properly in a
Russian context.  However, unlike the foreclosure-related problems and the need for
legislative steps, as noted above, a lack of mortgage experience data for MI pricing
purposes need not be viewed as a pre-requisite step for the government to proceed with
sponsoring a MI program.  Availability of mortgage experience data would be an
impediment more so for a private, than for a government MI sponsor.
(See Appendix C for recommendations on loan level data reporting.)
4. Design a mortgage default insurance law.  Regarding the creation of a special law
authorizing mortgage default insurance, the Ministry of Trade and Economic
Development should continue its investigation into what specific provisions would
be advisable to include.
Among those features that we recommend are:
?  Monoline charter
?  Stringent risk-based capital requirements
?  Prohibit rebates or commissions to insured lenders
?  Regulation of rates and contract forms
?  No interlocking controls between insured lenders and MI providers
?  Appropriate parallel provisions for MI reinsurance
?  Limits on geographic concentrations of insured risk exposure
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?  Reserve requirements that address the adequacy for both case basis and
catastrophic losses.
Passing such legislation could occur prior to the advent of serious interest by private
firms and, in fact, may expedite their interest if the legislation were structured properly.
On the other hand, international experience suggests that an increased impetus to act on
such legislation may arise when a strong and willing firm seeking to enter the market
approaches the government and assists in design of the laws needed for a special MI
charter to be granted.  In any event, we recommend that the initial priority should be
toward establishing a sound government-sponsored MI in a manner that would closely
replicate an effectively regulated private MI venture (see Recommendation No.5 below).
5. The initial MI program sponsor should be the Federal Government, in the form
of either a new Development Institution or new Government-owned special-purpose
insurance fund.  Private capital should be encouraged to enter whenever feasible.
In most respects, private MI sponsorship supported by private MI risk capital would be
preferable.  However, given the current risks and uncertainties identified in this report,
we believe it unlikely that private MI risk capital will find the Russian market attractive
in the immediate future, given the type of substantial, long-term, exclusive commitment
that will be needed.  The alternative of a NGO/nonprofit sponsorship offers no valid
reasons to pursue. This, in essence, leaves some form of government sponsorship as the
one broad remaining option.  In turn, this option also leaves open many possibilities.
As to which level of government should sponsor MI, we recommend that the Russian
Federal Government be the initial sponsor of a startup national MI program.  Regional
authorities across the Russian Federation certainly play a central role today in housing
finance.  Their potential role relative to a mortgage default insurance program— as an
insured, sponsor, co-insurer, or beneficiary— needs to be considered.  We’ve noted, for
example, the presence of state-sponsored MI programs in the U.S.  Regional entities,
however, inherently lack a critical advantage of any federally-sponsored MI in a large
country, be it the Russian Federation or the U.S.  That inherent advantage is the ability to
achieve great geographic and market dispersion of risk, as well as independence in
establishing risk acceptance criteria.
What type of MI entity should the Federal Government create?  For the dual reasons of
(1) effectively managing its own credit risk exposure, and (2) expediting a future
transition to privately capitalized sponsorship and/or public-private partnership, we
recommend that the government-sponsored MI entity be formed to resemble a private
insurance fund as much as possible.  Under existing federal law, we believe that there are
at least two possible vehicles to establish such an entity:
?  A new special-purpose Development Institution, comparable to the Agency for
Home Mortgage Lending (AHML) or the Russian Development Bank; or
?  A new, wholly government-owned, special purpose insurance corporation.
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Key operating parameters a publicly chartered entity should adhere to in order to function
as if it were a private insurance enterprise include:
?  Maintain actuarially-based pricing.
?  Maintain risk-based capital reserves sufficient to pay all claims, including those
that could be expected during a period of severe economic adversity.
?  Establish independent standards for approving individual lenders as program
participants; also, standards for prudent underwriting of individual loans— both
to be free of political influence.
?  Hire management and professional staff at competitive market salaries.
?  Invest in information and communications technology that enable operating
efficiencies, risk management and client service standards on a par with a
competitive private business.
?  Mandate annual financial and operational audits that are conducted by non-
government (private) auditors in addition to the normative audits and
examinations performed by insurance regulators.
?  Secure and maintain a minimum investment grade rating for claims-paying
capacity  (independent of any contingent government guaranty that may be
provided).
?  Segregate from the MI program any form of subsidized/social housing initiatives,
including all types of public subsidies or other forms of special assistance to
social housing or special need designated categories of borrowers.
6. The government-sponsored MI entity should be structured to allow for a variety
of possible public-private partnerships and either partial or full privatization in
time.
In addition to being run as much ‘like a business’ as possible, the charter should
expressly provide for a full range of potential risk-sharing arrangements, including:
?  Reinsurance (with either the public or the private party being able to serve as
direct insurer or reinsurer);
?  Coinsurance, i.e., a sharing of the primary risk; and
?  Catastrophic ‘insurer of last resort’— a role only the government can realistically
fulfill.
44
7. The initial MI provider inside Russia should adopt proven risk management
practices and program features, drawing upon MI experience gained outside the
Russian Federation— and adapt these features to the unique characteristics of the
Russian market.
Among the time-proven program characteristics that should be adopted in some form are
the following:
?  Risk-sharing with the originating lender.  Avoid 100 percent coverage of
individual loans.  It is not be needed and should not be adopted.  This decision
will leave many choices on how to structure risk sharing that will meet lender’s
need and achieve basic program goals, while avoiding the ‘moral hazard’ of
eliminating all risk to the lender.  Eliminating the risk of any loss weakens the
lender’s motivation to underwrite and service its insured loans as if they were
uninsured.
?  Establish a loan level coverage amount (first loss percentage) that assures the
bank that it will be in an equivalent or slightly better position, in terms of
remaining risk exposure, than it would have been on an uninsured loan made at
the benchmark (70 percent) LTV.  For example, an 85 percent LTV should have
minimum MI coverage of least 20 percent, while coverage up to 30 percent would
be a reasonable maximum limit.
?  Limit Insurable loans to: (1) residential dwelling units; (2) first liens; (3) legal
persons as borrowers (no corporate entities); (4) borrowers who will be owner-
occupants; and (5) properties where construction has been completed.
?  A conservative insurable loan-to-value ceiling should be applied initially— higher
than the existing uninsured benchmark LTV, but lower than the expected eventual
goal.  One possible ‘rule-of-thumb’ might be to use MI initially to cut in half the
minimum cash required of the borrower. For example move from the uninsured
70 percent LTV benchmark in Russia to an insured 85 percent LTV.  After some
experience unfolds at this new limit, experiment with further modest increases.
?  Establish maximum MI insurable loan amounts. The upper limit needs to be set at
a level that allows upper-middle class housing to be insured, but which excludes
the acceptance of excessive risk on large loans for luxury housing.
?  Accept underwriting risks based upon the MI review of individual loan
information but only after the loan has been underwritten and found acceptable to
the Insured Lender.
?  Exclude coverage of losses caused by fraud, whether committed by the
originating lender, the borrower, the builder, or any combination of interested
parties.  (Note: As the secondary market develops, coverage for these risks may
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need to be extended to third party investors, but under conditions of full recourse
to the primary lender.)
?  Consumer protections:  The owner-occupant borrower should not be held liable to
the MI provider to repay his/her defaulted loan balance following the MI’s
payment of a claim to the insured lender.
?  Minimum property standards for insured loans in Russia could provide a dual
benefit of risk management for the MI fund and better housing for the Russian
people.  The Russian housing stock reportedly suffers from widespread serious
deterioration, and in many areas is overwhelmingly aging wood frame
construction.  Though not widely recognized today, the U.S. Federal Housing
Administration (FHA) mortgage insurance program’s Minimum Property
Standards historically helped to improve the physical quality of working class
housing throughout the country. In any case the MI will need to specify the types
of properties that it will insure.
8.  A new government-sponsored MI provider should be a freestanding, independent
agency.  Despite the extensive commonality of mission between a MI provider and
the AHML, these two functions— and the agencies that perform them— should be
separate.
Among the reasons for separation: A central part of the MI provider’s mission, especially
at the outset, will be oriented toward the primary mortgage market, in contrast to the
secondary market mission of AHML.  Also, future partnering with private sector insurers
and reinsurers, and even eventual privatization, should be more expeditious if the MI
entity has a single, clear-cut mission.  Of course, regarding the ongoing development of
Russia’s secondary mortgage market, AHML and the MI provider should enjoy a
significant strategic alignment.
9. Some work should be undertaken, both before and after the launching of MI, to
design and market adjustable rate/payment mortgage instruments that better fit the
economic and market conditions of the Russian Federation.
Today, most home loans made in Russia are: (a) USD denominated and (b) fixed
rate/fixed payment.  While there is some movement away from USD toward Ruble
lending, fixed rate/fixed payment loans seem to be the continuing norm.  A domestically
sponsored MI program should be able to encourage not only more Ruble lending, but an
extension of the loan terms and even a transition to indexed, adjustable payment loan
instruments that can better balance the inevitable mix between credit, liquidity and
interest rate risks faced by lenders.
While a detailed inquiry into the risk-related characteristics of alternative mortgage
instruments is beyond the scope of this Report, we offer several brief comments about MI
and mortgage instrument design:
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?  In a volatile economy, USD denominated loans are risky for borrowers, and fixed
rate loans are risky for lenders.
?  An improvement, with the support of MI, would be standardized loan instruments
with adjustable rates tied to a transparent index.
?  Insurable adjustable loans would have reasonable limits on rate and payment
adjustments and any potential negative amortization.
?  The MI provider should be especially well positioned to set these instrument
standards.
?  The ideal adjustable mortgage instrument will reduce borrower financing costs
and improve the lenders overall credit, interest rate and liquidity risk exposure.
?  Adjustable rate loans and especially those with negative amortization
represent significantly greater risk for default frequency and ultimately a MI’s
losses. Tariffs would necessarily be increased for these types of insured loans.
10. The process for developing a detailed MI program and operational plan for the
Russian Federation would benefit from the formation of an expert inter-disciplinary
MI Working Committee.  A suitable lead agency for advancing the MI plan,
following passage of authorizing legislation, may be the Ministry of Trade and
Economic Development.
The MI Working Committee should include both public and private sector officials and
experts.  Committee members should represent mortgage lending (private banking), the
insurance industry, institutional mortgage investors, the insurance regulator, the
Ministries of Finance, the Ministry of Construction and Housing, the Ministry of Trade
and Economic Development, the Central Bank, and AHML.  Regional housing agencies’
input will need to be incorporated directly or through their review and comment on the
Working Group’s proposals prior to their adoption.
An agenda for reaching consensus on a multitude of decisions, ranging from broad policy
matters to specific policy terms and eventual staffing and budgeting can be managed by
designating small working groups of experts focused on resolution of issues within their
respective areas of expertise.  This type of process appears to be working slowly, but
successfully in Kazakhstan.  Russia has sufficient time to pursue a similarly deliberate
approach.
The sponsor will need to determine early on: What are to be the priorities and objectives
of the MI program?  This decision will drive both program design and the overall
business plan and provide direction for the working groups.  The critical question in this
regard likely will be: Will the initial MI program be directed mainly toward expanding
home financing by primary lenders via relaxed underwriting/lower LTV requirements?
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Or, will the primary reason for offering MI be to expedite the safe, growing flow of
capital to primary lenders from secondary market sources?
Based upon our limited recent research, we believe that a primary (direct lending) market
orientation for MI should be, and will be, the focus of initial planning and activity.
However, the primary market planning process needs to consider the necessary
components, requirements and rules to ensure that a useful role will also emerge for MI
in the secondary market, as well as the possible MBS market to follow (for example,
setting minimum investment grade ratings for mortgage-backed paper bought by pension
funds and other institutional investors).
11. Even though private MI risk capital is unlikely to emerge at the outset, outside
expertise might be engaged to help guide the initial government-sponsored MI
venture during the early phases of its activity.
In particular, foreign expertise in the areas of technology and risk management might be
engaged to participate in the startup management of a new Russian Federation MI
program.  This process could be initiated by preparing a detailed Request for Proposals
(RFP) that could be provided to a number of pre-qualified potential respondents having
direct experience in MI management.  Selecting the most qualified finalists among
competing respondents could, itself, be done by a panel of designated experts in a public
forum and according to criteria established by the MI Working Committee.
12. The Central Bank should begin to give consideration to special risk-based
capital treatment for residential mortgage loans made by banks, including
recognition of MI.
Such a plan could serve to accomplish two worthy objectives:
?  Favorable risk-based capital rules for home loans, vis-à-vis business and
commercial real estate and construction loans, would increase the profitability for
banks making home loans, thereby providing an impetus for banks to pursue an
activity that has been assigned top priority by government policymakers; and
?  Favorable risk-based capital treatment including high-risk, high LTV ratio loans
only if protected by qualified mortgage default insurance would encourage the
robust development of a Russian MI program that would require prudent loan
underwriting by banks using the program, while also averting adverse selection of
risks for MI coverage by lenders.
Proper timing, however, is a critical component of this recommendation.  At present the
Central Bank holds a view, shared by some other market participants, that the residential
mortgage loan in Russia today inherently lacks the superior credit quality needed to
justify favorable capital treatment.  This view is held, not because banks that are making
such loans are choosing to do so irresponsibly.  Rather, there is concern— which we
share— that the current lending environment regarding title and other legal uncertainties,
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inability to recover collateral, lack of market data, distrust among buyers, sellers and
banks, and the ‘gray economy’, detracts from what should be the inherently high credit
quality of home mortgage loans.
Therefore, the Central Bank does not need to rush into issuing capital rules favoring
home loans, but should consider what evidence of reduced risk will need to accrue before
taking such a step.  Only when the needed reforms have been implemented should the
Central Bank confer favorable risk-based capital treatment to home loans.  In any event,
the Central Bank should avoid conferring favorable capital treatment to all home loans
without first analyzing the relative risks of higher LTV, lower borrower equity home
loans.
13. Investment rating agencies should be invited to participate in the development
and broad market acceptance of a financially credible MI provider, including one
that is initially government-sponsored.
Moscow-based rating agencies with global affiliation (e.g., Standard & Poor’s,
FitchIBCA, Moody’s) should have the technical capability, the resources and the
incentives to perform the following important functions:
?  Analyze and certify the MI fund’s long-term claims-paying capacity, including
under economic stress; based upon the fund’s freestanding financial strength and
liquidity, independent of any backup government guaranty, i.e., assign a “shadow
rating”;
?  Help government regulators in adopting minimum market-based standards for
eligible mortgage-related investments by government or regulated private pension
funds, insurance companies, investment companies and mutual funds; and
?  In rating banks, provide an ancillary standard that will help the MI provider
identify weaknesses among banks that are seeking mortgage insurance coverage.
14. While recognizing the social objectives of any government-sponsored MI
program, support for social housing and special needs borrower— whether by
means of direct subsidy or other program attributes— should be kept transparent,
separate and distinct from the of the MI fund itself.
If carefully conceived, the startup MI program can address both its inherent social
objectives and the need to operate as a financially sound and sustainable insurance fund.
The essence of doing so is twofold:
?  Assuring that the MI’s capital reserve fund be credited with premium revenues
that fully correspond to the attributable risks, properly underwritten; and
?  To the extent that a decision is made to subsidize any risk, or class of risk
assumed, disclose and fund such subsidies in full at the time the risk is assumed.
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Apart from the MI program, social goals that support affordable homeownership can take
the form of direct borrower subsidies other than lowering the MI tariff itself.  For
example, some types of lump sum down payment assistance can work in tandem with MI
for borrowers that lack the requisite down payment.  This separate, but complementary,
assistance could take the form of outright grants, or interest-free loans with a lien,
repayable only if the borrower sells, transfers or fails to owner-occupy the property for a
certain number of years after receiving the one-time subsidy.
A temporary, or short term “buy-down” of the market interest rate, though less desirable
than a one-time assistance payment at closing, can also work in conjunction with MI
under certain circumstances, e.g., for upwardly mobile borrowers.
Any long-term (multiple year) interest rate subsidies, or any type of construction-related
(“supply side”) subsidy should not be considered and is unsuitable for the insurance of
mortgage default risk.
In summary, the Russian Federation has made great strides in only a few years to build
the foundations for rapid future growth in its private sector housing and mortgage
markets.  If economic stability can be maintained, Russian citizens can anticipate a
steady, perhaps even breathtaking at times, improvement in their housing and home
ownership opportunities.
Mortgage default insurance is but one component of housing finance— potentially an
important contributor, if implemented properly at the right time.  Housing finance, of
course, is one of several forces that can fuel increased demand, but it must be
accompanied by a matching supply in order to avoid mere inflation of home prices.
This Report’s recommendations suggest a substantive agenda of positive actions that
should be undertaken in preparation for launching a successful mortgage default
insurance program.  These advance actions will all serve a broader purpose of
strengthening housing finance generally.
After these actions have been taken, this Report offers recommendations on how best to
sponsor, structure and manage an effective MI program.  Finally, this Report offers
suggestions on who should participate in shaping a MI program for Russia that fits
Russia’s own needs and circumstances, and how such a work effort might be organized.
50
Appendix A
List of Interviewees and References
Interviewees (all Moscow, except as otherwise indicated):
1. Konstantin Nikolaevich Aprelev,Vice President, Russian Guild of Realtors
2. Vera Balakireva, Head of Insurance Supervision Department, The Ministry of
Finance
3. Dmitry Urievich Budakov, General Director and Chairman, Moscow Mortgage
Agency
4. Canada Housing and Mortgage Corporation, Ottawa, Canada
5. Ezer Mortgage Guaranty, Ltd., Tel Aviv Israel
6. Vladimir Gasyak, Advisor to the President, Troika Dialogue
7. Oleg Ivanov, Secretary of the Expert Council of the Committee on Credit
Organizations and Financial Markets, The State Duma, The Federal Assembly of
Russia
8. Elena Klepikova, President, National Reserve Mortgage Company
(National Reserve Bank)
9. Alexander Korobov, President, Votec Insurance Company
10. Alexander B. Kopeikin, Real Estate Reforms Legal Advisor, The Institute for
Urban Economics
11. Nadezhda B. Kosareva, President, The Institute for Urban Economics
12. Ilya Lomakin-Rumyantsev, Deputy Head of Council of Federation Budgetary
Committee
13. Vadim Malikh, Head of New Building Projects Department, Miel Real Estate
14. Svetlana Melnikova, Deputy Chief of Mortgage Department, European Trust
Bank
15. Andrew N. Milyutin, Head of Methodology Department, Agency for Housing
Mortgage Lending
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16. Anna S. Menshikova, Department of Finances, Subdivision of Financial Market
and Institutions Development, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade
of the Russian Federation
17. Victor Mints, Lead Economist, Alpha-Bank
18. Sergey Ogorodnikov, Director of Discount and Internal Audit Department,
Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending
19. Natalia Pastoukhova, Vice President, European Trust Bank
20. Alexander Pavlovich Lebedinov, Deputy Director, Rosno Company
21. Irina Penkina, Associate, Financial Institutions, Standard & Poor’s
22. Vitalyi Pereslavskyi, Advisor to the Chairman of the Management Board,
European Trust Bank
23. PMI Mortgage Insurance Company/The PMI Group, San Francisco CA, USA,
and Sydney Australia.
24. Vladimir Nickolaevich Ponomarev, State Secretary, Deputy Minister, Ministry of
the Russian Federation for Construction and Housing Complex
25. Bertrand Renaud, The World Bank (retired), MacLean, VA, USA
26. Natalia N. Rogozhina, Real Estate Reforms Project Manager, The Institute for
Urban Economics
27. Irina Yu. Sedova, Deputy Director, Banking Regulation and Supervision
Department, Central Bank of the Russian Federation (Bank of Russia)
28. Yulia A. Shataokhina, Chief Economist, Central Bank of Russian Federation,
Banking Regulation and Supervision Department
29. Andrey Yu. Suchkov, Vice President, Vneshtorgbank
30. Len Sweeney, Senior Vice President, Credit Policy and Operations, AIG/United
Guaranty Corporation, Greensboro NC, USA.  Also, AIG/United Guaranty Corp.,
Ltd., Hong Kong.
31. Alexander Semenyaka, General Director, Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending
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32. Boris Shentsis, Finance Department, The Ministry of Trade and Economic
Development of the Russian Federation
33. Raymond J. Struyk, The Urban Institute; also, Representative Office Director,
The Institute for Urban Economics
34. Andre Tumanov, Expert, The Institute for Urban Economics
35. Darya Zueva – Candidate of Economic Sciences, Ingosstrakh Insurance Company
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Appendix B
Scorecard for MI Readiness – The Russian Federation
December 2003
 Function / Area Description    Level of Readiness   Issues
Importance Assessment
1 Information
1.1 Market information M 2 Minimal information is available
1.2 Mortgage lending performance M 2 Non-existent
1.3 Definitions - residential lending L 1 Non-existent
1.4 Pricing model data requirements M 1 Non-existent
2 Political and Social
2.1 Political initiatives and attitudes H 4
2.2 Government housing policy H 3
2.3 Social environment M 2 Lack of trust in financial institutions
3 Regulation and Legal
3.1 Regulation of banks M 3
3.2 Regulation of insurance M 2 Regulation not sufficiently codified
3.3 Regulation for mortgage insurance M 1 Non-existent
3.4 Laws H 1 Several laws changes to facilitate MI
3.5 Court system M 1 Not tested
4 Primary Mortgage Market
4.1 Banks lending practices H 3
4.2 Insurance product acceptance H 3
4.3 Property title (ownership) evidence H 2 Right to housing needs to be resolved
4.4 Registration transaction costs M 2 Expensive, slow, bureaucratic process
4.5 Credit reporting (credit bureau) L 1 Non-existent
4.6 Real estate appraisals M 3
4.7 Real estate sales agents M 3
4.8 Builders and developers M 1 Excessive risk for purchasers/borrower's
4.9 Property maintenance services L 3
5 Secondary Support Systems
5.1 Industry associations L 3
5.2 Secondary market L 3
5.3 Foreign Investor Interest L 2 Inadequate protection of investment
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Appendix B (cont’d)
Scorecard for MI Readiness – The Russian Federation
December 2003
Two Scorecard Ratings
1.  Importance Level relative to mortgage insurer's successful implementation:
      The following levels of importance are based on the consultants’ experience in direct management
of mortgage insurance companies and  observation of the optimal situations that exist in
   developed markets.
     H       High          Success is not possible unless adequate data, action, or support is forthcoming.
     M       Medium    Success in time should be attainable.  However, work must continue
               on adequate action, support or implementation.
     L       Low          Success can be achieved without appropriate action or support,
                       but it would tend to increase cost reduce efficiency of MI.
2.  Readiness Assessment Rating
      We have assigned the following subjective ratings, ranging from 5 (most ready) to 1 (least ready),
      that are designed to depict the state of readiness for each functional area noted with respect to the
      potential introduction of  mortgage default insurance in the Russian Federation.
       5     No significant improvements are required; existing status supports MI.
       4     Status is acceptable, but one or several aspects are less than fully supportive of MI.
       3     Marginal level of readiness; critical components exist, but significant improvement needed.
       2Status is questionable or inadequate to support MI implementation.
       1     Critical components either are non-existent or are detrimental to MI.
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Appendix C
Loan Level Reporting – Recommended Data
Central Bank Mortgage Loan Reporting Data Requirements
Loan level data to be supplied to CBR by Commercial Banks on residential mortgage loans.
Field  Needed for Needed for Not
Number Description of Data Item MI Pricing MI Risk Needed
   Evaluation for MI
A Borrower Information
1a Borrower Name(s) - Last x
1b Borrower Name(s) - First x
2 National Identification Number yes
3 Citizenship x
4 Total Liquid Assets yes
5 Occupancy yes
6 Income - monthly yes
7 Payment to income ratio yes
8 Debt to income ratio yes
9 Type of Occupation <<<< yes
10 Self-employed <<<< yes
11 Years with Firm (Time on Job) yes
12 Marital Status <<<< x
13 Age of Borrower yes
14 Title Held in one or both Names yes
15 First time home mortgage yes
16 Credit Report yes
17 Negative Credit History yes
B Loan Information
1 Originating Lender Name yes
1a Originating Lender Loan Number yes
2 Originated by Third Party - Name yes
3 Servicer Name yes
4 Investor's Name - if applicable x
5 LTV Ratio yes
6 Loan Amount yes
7 Loan Purpose yes
8 Type of Loan yes
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Loan Level Reporting – Recommended Data
Field  Needed for Needed for Not Needed
Number Description of Data Item MI Pricing MI Risk for MI
   Evaluation  
B Loan Information
9 Presence of Guaranty's (co-signors) yes
10 Origination date of loan yes
11 Seasoned number of years (age) yes
12 Lien Position of this loan yes
13 Number of Liens on Property ? yes
14 Total Amount ($, rubles) of all Liens on property yes
C Mortgage Default Insurance
1 Presence of Default insurance yes
2 Effective date of MI yes
3 Percentage of Coverage yes
4 MI term of coverage - years yes
5 Method of MI premium payment - M, A, S yes
6 MI premium paid by - Lender, borrower, other x
7 Provider of Default Insurance - Name yes
D Monthly Mortgage Components
1 Monthly principal and interest payment amount for this loan yes
2 Loan Term (in months) yes
3 Interest Rate <<<< yes
4 Negative Amortization Possible yes
5a Index value at loan origination date yes
5b Index used yes
6 Margin at loan origination date yes
7a First interest rate adjustment period - months yes
7b Periodic interest rate adjustment Cap yes
8 Lifetime interest rate Cap yes
9a First payment adjustment period - months yes
9b Periodic payment adjustment Cap yes
10 Monthly property (hazard) insurance yes yes
11 Monthly taxes and other municipal assessments yes yes
12 Common area maintenance property management fees yes yes
13 Monthly - other property related expenses yes yes
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Loan Level Reporting – Recommended Data
Field  Needed for Needed for Not
Number Description of Data Item MI Pricing MI Risk Needed
   Evaluation for MI
E Property Characteristics
1 Purchase Price of Property yes
2 Appraised Value of Property yes
3 Property Type yes
4 Square Meters Living Area yes
5 Unit under Construction at Time of this Loan ? <<<< yes
6 New or Existing unit yes
7 Year Constructed yes
8a Street Address and Number of Property x
8b City yes
8c Oblast (State) yes
8d Postal Zone - Russia yes
F Monthly Information During Life of the Loan
1 Mortgage Loan Payment Status yes
2 Unpaid Loan Balance yes
3 Amount of Any Loan Prepayment yes
G Information on a Loan in Default
1 Due Date for First Unpaid Monthly Mortgage Payment yes
2 Reason for Default yes
3a Property Maintenance and Repair costs yes
3b Taxes and Property Insurance yes
3c Unpaid Balance at Foreclosure yes
3d Accrued Interest through End of Foreclosure yes
3e Other Foreclosure Costs yes
4 Escrow Account Funds Available yes
5 Revised Property Valuation - if available yes
6 Gain or (Loss) to Bank after Sale of Property yes
7 Date upon which Foreclosure was Completed yes
8 Date of Sale of Collateral / REO yes
H Information on All Loans upon termination:
1 Reason for Loan Termination yes
2 Date of Loan Payoff yes
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Pricing Model Reference Values
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Mortgage Insurance Residential Guaranty Fund MIP Model Data Input Assumptions
 Pricing Criteria Proposed for Russia Market Risk Conditions
December 2003 Low Moderate Severe
LOAN CHARACTERISTICS:
Loan Interest Rate(s) 14.00% 18.00% 25.00%
Payoff Rate for Book Year (Constant Prepayment Rate) 15.00% 15.00% 15.00%
Underwriting And Acquisition Costs
UW Expenses - bps of new insurance written 75.00 75.00 75.00
Renewal Expenses - bps of insurance in force 15.00 15.00 15.00
Tax - % of collected premium 4.00% 4.00% 4.00%
Mortgage Insurance Claim Costs
Delinquent Interest in months 9 15 30
Legal / Foreclosure (as % of Loan Amount) 3.00% 5.00% 6.00%
Taxes and Insurance (% of Value) 1.00% 1.65% 3.30%
Maintenance / Holding Costs (% of Value) 4.00% 5.00% 6.00%
Salvage Value at Foreclosure Sale (% of Property Value) 70.00% 60.00% 50.00%
Financial Assumptions:
Discount Rate 12.00% 12.00% 12.00%
Investment Income Rate of Return 6.00% 6.00% 6.00%
Risk-to-Capital Ratio 25 25 25
Return on Required Capital 12.00% 12.00% 12.00%
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                                                     Appendix D (cont’d)
          Pricing Model Reference Values
ault Curve Adjustment – Loss Scaling Factor
 
 
Loss Scaling Factor of  4.444 was used to adjust the Model’s default curve frequency.
s default curve frequency adjustment reflects an expected book year default rate of 6.0%.
?  For loans with 10 year loan terms;
?  LTV Ratios of 85.0% or less; and
?  Moderate Market Risk environment
s adjustment is approximately 4 ½ times the default curve frequency experience in the U.S. market for
ixed-rate loans.
ting Notes:
The premium rate is computed by calculating a weighted average of the price determined for each of
the three market risk conditions. The weighting is 25% for the Low and Severe conditions and 50% for
the Moderate condition.
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Appendix E
Tariffs – a Preliminary Analysis
Loan Term 7 Years Loan Term 10 Years Loan Term 15 Years
LTV Coverage Single Annual Single Annual Single Annual
Ratio Percent Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate Rate
90% 50% 4.21% 1.19% 6.16% 1.58% 8.09% 1.98%
90% 40% 3.72% 1.05% 5.35% 1.38% 6.91% 1.69%
90% 35% 3.46% 0.97% 4.89% 1.26% 6.25% 1.53%
90% 30% 3.16% 0.89% 4.41% 1.14% 5.57% 1.37%
90% 25% 2.84% 0.80% 3.91% 1.01% 4.88% 1.20%
90% 20% 2.52% 0.71% 3.39% 0.87% 4.17% 1.02%
90% 15% 2.19% 0.62% 2.85% 0.73% 3.44% 0.84%
85% 50% 3.41% 0.96% 4.88% 1.26% 6.34% 1.55%
85% 40% 3.05% 0.86% 4.30% 1.11% 5.51% 1.35%
85% 35% 2.85% 0.80% 3.96% 1.02% 5.01% 1.23%
85% 30% 2.65% 0.75% 3.60% 0.93%  4.51% 1.10%
85% 25% 2.41% 0.68% 3.23% 0.83% 3.99% 0.98%
85% 20% 2.16% 0.61% 2.84% 0.73% 3.46% 0.85%
85% 15% 1.92% 0.54% 2.45% 0.63% 2.92% 0.71%
80% 50% 2.66% 0.75% 3.66% 0.94% 4.65% 1.14%
80% 40% 2.42% 0.68% 3.27% 0.84% 4.12% 1.01%
80% 35% 2.28% 0.64% 3.05% 0.78% 3.79% 0.93%
80% 30% 2.14% 0.60% 2.81% 0.72% 3.45% 0.85%
80% 25% 2.00% 0.56% 2.56% 0.66% 3.10% 0.76%
80% 20% 1.83% 0.52% 2.31% 0.59% 2.75% 0.67%
80% 15% 1.66% 0.47% 2.04% 0.52% 2.39% 0.58%
75% 50% 2.46% 0.69% 3.36% 0.86% 4.26% 1.04%
75% 40% 2.26% 0.64% 3.01% 0.78% 3.79% 0.93%
75% 35% 2.14% 0.60% 2.83% 0.73% 3.52% 0.86%
75% 30% 2.02% 0.57% 2.63% 0.68% 3.22% 0.79%
75% 25% 1.89% 0.53% 2.41% 0.62% 2.91% 0.71%
75% 20% 1.75% 0.49% 2.18% 0.56% 2.60% 0.64%
75% 15% 1.60% 0.45% 1.95% 0.50% 2.27% 0.56%
70% 50% 2.28% 0.64% 3.07% 0.79% 3.88% 0.95%
70% 40% 2.11% 0.60% 2.77% 0.71% 3.45% 0.85%
70% 35% 2.01% 0.57% 2.61% 0.67% 3.24% 0.79%
70% 30% 1.90% 0.54% 2.44% 0.63% 2.99% 0.73%
70% 25% 1.79% 0.50% 2.25% 0.58% 2.72% 0.67%
70% 20% 1.67% 0.47% 2.06% 0.53% 2.44% 0.60%
70% 15% 1.55% 0.44% 1.85% 0.48% 2.15% 0.53%
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Roger Blood
Mr. Blood specializes in the area of housing finance.  He provides consulting services
mainly relating to mortgage default insurance, both in the U.S. and internationally,
including:
?  Assisting in the development of databases and management information systems that
effectively address mortgage insurance risk management and marketing requirements.
?  Providing expert witness advice and court testimony on residential mortgage risk,
including insurance underwriting and claims practices, secondary marketing,
regulatory issues, credit and property risk evaluation, policy terms, loss reserving, and
loan servicing standards.
?  Advising private firms and public agencies outside the United States regarding
prospects and requirements for establishing mortgage default insurance programs.
Mr. Blood served for ten years as Senior Vice President— Risk Management for a
national mortgage insurance firm in the U.S.  His responsibilities included product
development, pricing, underwriting, quality control, claims, and reserve development.
Mr. Blood has been active with MICA, the U.S. mortgage insurance industry trade
association, since its formation 30 years ago.  He has worked with or led MICA
committees on risk management, appraisal standards, adjustable mortgages, Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac and mortgage banker liaisons, and EDI data standards for home
mortgage loans. He also served on the Fannie Mae Advisory Board for the Southeast
Region.
From 1990 to 2003, Mr. Blood has performed mortgage default insurance consulting
assignments for government and private clients in Argentina, Canada, India, Israel,
Mexico, New Zealand, Poland, Thailand, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S.
Mr. Blood has published several articles on mortgage risk and insurance and has co-
authored a book entitled The Private Insurance of Home Mortgages.
Since 1991, Mr. Blood has served as Chairman of the Housing Advisory Board for
Brookline, Massachusetts where he has worked on issues relating to affordable housing,
inclusionary zoning and rent control.  He is also a Director of the Boston Chapter of
Lambda Alpha International, an honorary land economics society.
Mr. Blood received his B.A. in economics from Clark University and M.B.A. in real
estate finance from the Wharton Graduate Division of the University of Pennsylvania.
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Douglas E. Whiteley
Mr. Whiteley specializes in the area of residential mortgage risk management and
mortgage default insurance. He provides consulting services relating to mortgage default
insurance and mortgage insurer operations both in the U.S. and internationally.  He has
performed the following types of assignments:
?  Recommending financing alternatives for replacing interest rate subsidy programs in
developing countries.
?  Providing on-site training and education on mortgage insurance and housing finance.
?  Developing customer support and response plans for e-commerce mortgage lending
business.
?  Providing expert witness testimony regarding acceptable practices and procedures for
the U.S. residential mortgage lending market.
?  Developing business and operational plans for the implementation of startup
mortgage default insurance companies.
?  Developing mortgage default insurance premium rate models and analyses.
Mr. Whiteley has held the position of Senior Vice President–Risk Management for
two U.S. Mortgage Insurance companies and for the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac).  He has over 25 years experience in the mortgage finance
and mortgage default insurance businesses.  His responsibilities have included:
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